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1. William R. Cline
The Role of the Private Sector in Resolving 
Financial Crises in Emerging Markets
6.1.1 Introduction
Three years have passed since the outbreak of the East Asian ﬁnancial
crisis, and six since that of its Mexican precursor. Numerous oﬃcial group-
ings and private analysts have sought to derive from these experiences ap-
propriate lessons for international policy, including especially the manner
in which private creditors can most fruitfully be involved in crisis resolution
(G10 1996; G22 1998; IMF 1999b; G7 1999; IIF, 1996, 1999 b,c; Council on
Foreign Relations 1999; Eichengreen 1999; Meltzer Commission 2000). Al-
though there is considerable agreement on the central issues of crisis pre-
vention, and although substantial improvement has occurred in this area
(including heightened data transparency and a shift from ﬁxed to ﬂoating
exchange rates by a number of key economies), more signiﬁcant diver-
gences persist regarding how to involve private creditors in the resolution of
those crises that do occur.
The principal divisions on the latter issue are on the questions of, ﬁrst,
whether oﬃcial support on the relatively large scale of the key packages of
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rea, and Brazil) or undesirable (e.g., because of the risk of moral hazard),
and, second, whether the nature of private-sector involvement should fol-
low predetermined rules or should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
On the latter question, some European oﬃcials have tended toward a rules
basis, whereas U.S. oﬃcials have emphasized the need for case-by-case res-
olution of crises.
This paper will suggest that the approach most in keeping with an un-
derstanding of today’s international capital markets is one that seeks to in-
volve private creditors on as voluntary a basis as possible given the cir-
cumstances, and that, within the classic principles of ﬁnancial crisis
management (Bagehot [1873] 1917), temporary large oﬃcial support can
indeed be appropriate where the country is illiquid rather than insolvent
and a prompt turnaround in private ﬂows through adjustment and restora-
tion of conﬁdence is likely.
Section 6.1.2 reviews the diﬀerences between today’s capital market and
that of the 1980s, as a basis for inferring appropriate changes in crisis reso-
lution strategy. Next the discussion considers what economic theory about
sovereign lending would tend to counsel in the design of crisis resolution ap-
proaches. The paper then turns to actual experience in several of the recent
country crisis cases. After evaluating one of the more prominent proposals
for reform (inclusion of collective action clauses in bonds) and brieﬂy con-
sidering the likely future composition of lending to emerging markets, the
discussion concludes with a synthesis of policy implications.
6.1.2 The 1980s versus the 1990s
It is sobering that each of the past two decades has witnessed a wide-
spread crisis in external ﬁnancing for emerging market economies. The
Latin America debt crisis of the 1980s was the more severe, precipitating a
“lost decade” of growth there and ending up in debt forgiveness of about 35
percent for bank claims on much of the region (Cline 1995, 234). The spate
of ﬁnancial crises that began in 1995 with Mexico and was followed by East
Asia in 1997–98, Russia in 1998, and Brazil in 1999 turns out to have been
approximately comparable in scope although not (generally) in severity.
Thus, as shown in table 6.1, the fraction of external debt to private creditors
involved reached about 60 percent of the emerging markets total in both the
1980s and 1990s crises. The geographical pattern was sharply diﬀerent, with
concentration in Latin America in the 1980s but involvement of Asia and
Russia in the 1990s.
The 1990s crises were more oriented toward collapses of currencies and
domestic ﬁnancial systems and less centered on excessive burdens of exter-
nal debt. A severe mismatch of large short-term external debt against re-
duced external reserves was a typical precipitating factor (especially in Mex-
460 William R. Clineico, Korea, and Thailand), rather than a high ratio of total external debt to
exports and gross domestic product (GDP), as was more typical in Latin
America in the 1980s. Underlying economic structures and policies tended
to be better in the 1990s (with the advent of trade liberalization, privatiza-
tion, and ﬁscal adjustment). Stronger underlying conditions and the shorter-
term nature of the ﬁnancial squeeze meant that it was possible for the key
economies involved in the 1990s crisis to return to economic growth much
faster than those in the 1980s crisis, and to do so on a basis of return to nor-
malized capital market access without debt forgiveness (excluding the cases
of Russia and Indonesia, where political incoherence was far more severe).
One important diﬀerence between the 1980s and 1990s was the preva-
lence of capital controls in the former and capital mobility in the latter. This
meant that when diﬃculties occurred in the 1980s, there was a tendency to
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Table 6.1 Scope of Debt and Financial Crises in the 1980s and 1990s (Debt owed to
private external creditors, $ billion)
1984 1996
Bank Other Total Bank Other Total
Latin America
Argentina 32.7 8.1 40.8 — — —
Bolivia 1.1 0.1 1.2 — — —
Brazil 79.8 4.7 84.5 51.2 126.4 177.6
Chile 16.0 0.7 16.7 — — —
Ecuador 4.9 0.5 5.4 2.3 6.2 8.5
Mexico 81.2 5.7 86.9 30.1 79.4 109.5
Peru 4.5 1.1 5.6 — — —
Uruguay 2.9 1.0 3.9 — — —
Venezuela 31.8 3.2 35.0 — — —
Africa and Middle East
Cote d’Ivoire 4.9 0.9 5.8 — — —
Morocco 3.5 0.1 3.6 — — —
Europe
Poland 7.2 1.5 8.7 — — —
Russia — — — 37.7 25.0 62.7
Asia and Paciﬁc
Indonesia — — — 55.9 25.2 81.1
Korea— —— 127.8 28.8 156.6
Pakistan — — — 4.4 5.8 10.2
Malaysia — — — 19.8 13.9 33.7
The Philippines 14.4 3.7 18.1 12.2 15.4 27.6
Thailand — — — 68.8 13.5 82.3
Total 284.9 31.3 316.2 410.2 339.6 749.8
Percent of total for 37 major 
emerging market economies 65.7 41.5 62.1 57.4 54.4 56.0
Source: IIF (1994, 2000b)
Note: Dash indicates that country was not directly involved in the period’s crisis.go into arrears on oﬃcial debt and to ration availability of foreign exchange
for payment of external debt by private ﬁrms that otherwise were capable of
servicing it. In contrast, under mobile capital regimes in the 1990s, the crises
manifested themselves in plunging exchange rates rather than foreign ex-
change rationing, and in balance sheet shocks to domestic banks and cor-
porations exposed in foreign currency–denominated obligations. The pres-
ence of capital quantity rationing in the 1980s in contrast to price clearing
in the 1990s is one reason the latter crisis was shorter and much more front-
loaded in its severity.1
Table 6.1 shows a crucial diﬀerence between the capital markets in the
1980s and the late 1990s. For the emerging markets in aggregate, in 1984 ex-
ternal debt to banks was nine times as large as that owed to nonbank private
creditors. In contrast, in 1996 the debt owed to banks was approximately
equal to that owed to nonbanks, the latter primarily in the form of bonds.
These estimates conﬁrm the by now widely recognized transformation of the
emerging markets’ debt composition from overwhelming dominance by in-
ternational banks to approximate parity between bank and bond obligations.
Another key diﬀerence between the two decades is that for the banks, ex-
posure to emerging markets was much larger relative to their total assets
and capital in the 1980s than it is today. Thus, for U.S. banks, exposure to
emerging market economies fell from 12 percent of total assets in 1982 to
2.5 percent in early 2000 (Dallara 2000). The sharp reduction in banks’ vul-
nerability to emerging markets’ debt, combined with the decline in their
share of total debt, has meant that increasingly such 1980s-style solutions
as “concerted lending” by banks have become outdated.
Finally, by the late 1990s the capital markets were much more heavily
dominated by equity ﬂows, especially direct investment, than in the 1980s,
when bank lending was predominant. Thus, of total net foreign private cap-
ital ﬂows to twenty-nine major emerging market economies, direct equity
accounted for 31 percent in 1993–96 but rose to 68 percent in 1997–2000
(IIF 2000a,b). As a result, the impact of private-creditor participation in
crisis resolution has become at least as important through its conﬁdence
eﬀect on direct investment ﬂows as through its direct capital impact
through lending. The same point applies to portfolio equity ﬂows, although
these have held more steady (15 percent of net foreign capital ﬂows in the
ﬁrst period and 13 percent in the second). In contrast, both direct and port-
folio capital ﬂows to emerging markets in the period 1980–84 accounted for
only 11 percent of the total in that period, with net ﬂows from banks ac-
counting for 74 percent and nonbank private credits accounting for 15 per-
cent (IIF database).
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1. Thus, Korea’s GDP fell 6.7 percent in 1998 but by 2000 was 13 percent above its 1997 level.
In comparison, weighting by 1984–86 GDP, output fell only 1.6 percent in 1983 for Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico, but by 1986 it was still only 10 percent above the 1982 base (IMF 1999a).Other contrasts between the 1980s and 1990s are also important. There
has been a shift in lending away from sovereign borrowers toward private
corporate and bank borrowers. Within bank lending, there has been a shift
toward shorter-term (typically trade-related) credits, in part because banks
considered long-term lending to Latin America to be vulnerable to restruc-
turing after the 1980s experience. Finally, the shift away from bank toward
bond and other nonbank lending has been especially pronounced when
evaluated in terms of ﬂows rather than outstanding stocks (cumulative new
net ﬂows from banks to twenty-nine major emerging market economies in
1997–2000 will have been –$61 billion, compared to $204 billion from non-
bank lenders). As discussed below, there are reasons to expect the role of
banks to remain reduced in the future, even though their net lending is likely
to turn positive again.
The overall implication that emerges from consideration of today’s com-
position of capital markets is that involvement of bank lending alone will
usually be too small in potential to resolve crises directly. Instead, the prin-
cipal impact will have to be through the general improvement in conﬁdence
that any such involvement will have for a much broader array of capital
ﬂows, especially in the form of direct investment. This inference is consis-
tent with the premise that market-oriented, voluntary resolutions are desir-
able, because it is such outcomes that are most likely to preserve a capital-
market atmosphere that is congenial to business as usual for direct
investment, portfolio equity ﬂows, and new bond issues.
6.1.3 Conceptual Framework2
Default Pain as Quasi-Collateral
It is crucial that policies toward crisis resolution be framed with an un-
derstanding of the underlying theory of sovereign lending. A seminal con-
tribution to this theory is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). They ask why any-
one would lend to a foreign sovereign. There is no physical collateral. The
tradition of sovereign immunity is a further deterrent. Their analysis ap-
peals to consumption smoothing as the motive for sovereign borrowing.
Countries borrow abroad when times are bad (e.g., because of an export
price collapse) and repay when they are good. On the side of lending supply,
the principal assurance lenders have that they will be repaid is the sovereign
borrower’s knowledge that if it defaults it will be locked out of capital mar-
kets in the future and will no longer have recourse to the opportunity to bor-
row for consumption smoothing.
This theory means that any international arrangements that convey the
impression that default is painless will tend to depress capital ﬂows to
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2. Also see Cline (2000b).emerging market economies. Essentially, a default-friendly international
regime deprives international lenders of their quasi-collateral: heightened
economic diﬃculty for the defaulter. The defaulting country may enjoy a
one-time windfall gain of not having to repay its outstanding debt, but it
will face a dearth of willing lenders in the future. Perhaps more important,
there will be a negative externality of the defaulting country’s actions for
other emerging market borrowers. If it is blessed by an international regime
seen as facilitating the default, the country’s actions will increase the per-
ceived risk of lending to all emerging market borrowers.
In such a conceptual framework, it is easy to see how good intentions by
international policymakers could turn counterproductive. There are
grounds for judging that this in fact happened during the course of 1999–
2000. The seeming shift toward oﬃcial international facilitation of default,
most notably in the case of Ecuador, seems likely to bear some responsibil-
ity for the sluggishness of the return of capital ﬂows to emerging markets
three years after the onset of the East Asia crisis and the persistence of high
lending spreads to many emerging market economies. Thus, for 2000 the
net ﬂow of bank and nonbank (mainly bond) lending to twenty-nine major
emerging market economies is projected by the Institute of International
Finance (IIF) at only $26 billion (IIF 2000a). Although this is up from the
trough of –$17 billion in 1999, it remains minimal compared to the average
of $157 billion annually in 1995–97.
Similarly, whereas spreads (above U.S. Treasury obligations) on long-
term Eurobonds for Argentina and Brazil averaged 360 basis points at the
end of 1996, by early September 2000 they were still as high as an average
of 680 basis points, albeit below their peak average of 1,240 basis points at
the end of August 1998 after the Russian default. A spread of 700 basis
points on thirty-year paper implies a probability of default of two-thirds if
the recovery rate is 50 percent (Cline and Barnes 1997, 40). This seems an
exaggerated pessimism and is consistent with a capital market that remains
poorly recovered from the crises of the late 1990s.
Moral Hazard
On the other side, the principal conceptual argument that has been in-
voked in favor of “bailing in” private creditors and leaning toward ensuring
they take default losses has been that otherwise the public sector would be
creating a moral hazard that would induce excessive lending and risk-
taking by creditors anticipating high returns in the good-case outcome and
public bailout in the bad.
The large headline ﬁgures for the oﬃcial support packages of the late
1990s ($50 billion for Mexico, $17 billion for Thailand, $34 billion for In-
donesia, $57 billion for Korea, $16 billion for Russia, and $42 billion for
Brazil; IIF 1999c, 48) not surprisingly spurred critiques that such public
support had created moral hazard (e.g., Meltzer Commission 2000). It is
464 William R. Clinecertainly likely that even the meager lending ﬂows that have returned would
have been smaller, and the still high spreads would have been higher yet, in
the absence of these packages and the strong turnarounds they permitted in
most of these crises (with Russia and Indonesia the exceptions, primarily
for political reasons).
The more fundamental point, however, is that public-sector intervention
that permits a large positive-sum-game outcome will often have some in-
evitable moral hazard side eﬀect, just as the existence of automobile insur-
ance and home theft insurance may at the margin make drivers a bit less
cautious and homeowners a bit more willing to go on long trips. The cen-
tral question is not whether there is moral hazard, but whether it is large and
whether its costs exceed the social beneﬁts provided by the intervention in
question. There is no doubt that the impressive economic recoveries in
Mexico, Korea, Brazil, and to a lesser extent Thailand would not have hap-
pened without the conﬁdence supplied by the oﬃcial support programs, so
their social beneﬁts appear to have been large.
As for moral hazard costs, in the large ﬁnancial crises of the late 1990s
private creditors and investors took large losses, so they are hardly likely to
have learned the lesson that emerging markets’ investments are risk-free be-
cause of oﬃcial bailouts. Thus, realized or potential losses by foreign in-
vestors in emerging markets in 1997–98 from the East Asian and Russian
crises amounted to about $240 billion in stock markets, $60 billion for
banks, and $50 billion for other creditors including bondholders (IIF
1999c, 57–61). Speciﬁc econometric tests reject the hypothesis that the ﬁrst
of the packages, for Mexico in 1995, induced excessive lending at low
spreads.3After the broader set of support programs in the late 1990s, the ev-
idence shows that lending ﬂows remain small and spreads remain high,
strongly suggesting that any moral hazard was too small to induce excessive
new lending at unduly low interest rates. In short, the critique that public
support in resolving the major ﬁnancial crises of the late 1990s involved
moral hazard is true but trivial and misses the more relevant point that
moral hazard costs were minor relative to recovery beneﬁts.4
Burden Sharing
A general notion that the private sector should bear its share of the “bur-
den” of resolving ﬁnancial crises has also driven policy discussions. Here
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3. Zhang (1999). The tests show instead that the large ﬂows at low spreads by early 1997 were
driven by global capital market conditions as proxied by spreads in the U.S. high-yield corpo-
rate market. Removing this inﬂuence and that of country-speciﬁc economic debt and eco-
nomic indicators, emerging markets’ spreads in the fourth quarter of 1995 through the second
quarter of 1997 were not statistically signiﬁcantly lower than before the Mexican support pro-
gram.
4. It should be noted that the one country where moral hazard likely played a signiﬁcant role
in buoyant lending was Russia, where geopolitical importance was frequently assumed to en-
sure support if needed.the key is to recognize the intertemporal pattern likely in well-managed
crises. At the height of the crisis there may be temporary public-sector sup-
port even as private lending is low or even negative. Once forceful adjust-
ment measures are taken and it becomes clear the country will not enter
into protracted default, a strong renewed inﬂow of private ﬂows can occur.
Thus, in Korea, net private capital inﬂows (including equity) fell from $48
billion in 1996 to –$14 billion in 1997 and –$24 billion in 1998 but re-
bounded to $8 billion in 1999 and $24 billion in 2000. Net oﬃcial ﬂows were
–$0.4 billion in 1996 and jumped to $18 billion in 1997 and $12 billion in
1998, but they dropped to –$9 billion in 1999 as Korea repaid International
Monetary Fund (IMF) funding. Thus, although a snapshot of capital ﬂows
at the height of the crisis in 1998 would give the impression that the public
sector was bearing the burden and the private sector was escaping, this in-
terpretation would miss the more fundamental point of the balance-wheel
role of oﬃcial intervention and the dynamic picture of a return to private
ﬂows once adjustment measures have been taken and conﬁdence restored.
A similar U-shaped pattern for private ﬂows, complemented by an inverted-
U shape for public ﬂows, depicts the resolution of the Mexican crisis in 1995
and the Brazilian crisis in 1998–99 (Cline 2000b).
It is also the case that for emerging markets as a whole, private capital
ﬂows have by far dominated the totals, casting further doubt on any
broader impression that the burden of development ﬁnance is being borne
by the public sector (even though the private ﬂows are certainly not under-
taken to shoulder any burden, but for proﬁt). Even in 1997–98 at the height
of the crises, net public capital ﬂows to twenty-nine major emerging market
economies were less than one-fourth private ﬂows (a two-year total of $97
billion versus $409 billion, respectively). By 1999–2000, the relationship
was back to its far more lopsided dominance by private ﬂows, with a total
of only $8 billion in net oﬃcial ﬂows versus $330 billion in net private ﬂows
(IIF 2000a).
The most narrow application of burden sharing is in the notion of “com-
parability” for private-sector treatment in Paris Club rescheduling of bilat-
eral claims.5For example, if within the Paris Club oﬃcial creditors resched-
ule for, say, a three-year period payments otherwise due to their export
credit agencies, comparability would lead them to make it a condition of the
rescheduling that the borrowing government seek rescheduling for a simi-
lar period from private creditors. Although unexceptionable in principle,
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5. The Paris Club is an arrangement used by industrial-country governments when it be-
comes necessary to negotiate the restructuring of claims owed to their agencies by a govern-
ment or private borrowers in a particular country. The term dates from 1956 when bilateral
oﬃcial creditors met in Paris to reschedule claims owed by Argentina (Rieﬀel 1985, 3). Prin-
ciples of Paris Club rescheduling include the requirement that the country be engaged in an
IMF adjustment program and that “comparable treatment” be granted to the debtor country
by other creditors (traditionally commercial banks and, where relevant, bilateral creditors not
normally in the Paris Club).this concept has sometimes been applied in questionable ways. Apparent
public-sector support for default on Ecuador’s Brady bonds—which had
already forgiven private claims, whereas bilateral claims had not been for-
given—is one example (although the Paris Club itself may not have for-
mally requested Ecuador to default prior to the government’s action). Paris
Club relief for political purposes, as in the case of Poland in the early 1990s,
is questionably appropriate for extension to the private sector, which does
not enjoy the same political beneﬁts as the industrial-country governments.
Nor has the Paris Club typically accepted comparability when it could work
in the opposite direction. A notable recent case is that of Russia, where pri-
vate creditors gave substantial forgiveness in early 2000, but the Paris Club
has resisted Russian government requests to grant comparable forgive-
ness.
The underlying point is that a rigid approach to burden sharing will be
misguided when its eﬀect is to damage the prospects of return to voluntary
capital markets and thereby is more likely to harm than help the country in
question over the medium term.
Market-Based Collective Action
An important concept for understanding the potential for private-sector
involvement in crisis resolution is that of private-sector collective action on
a voluntary or quasi-voluntary basis. Where a moderate number of rela-
tively large ﬁnancial institutions have short-term claims coming due, they
may be able to carry out a joint action that is to their collective beneﬁt by
undertaking to maintain rather than run oﬀ their credit lines. This was the
case in the Korean crisis (more formally through conversion of short-term
to one- to three-year claims) and the Brazilian crisis (less formally through
a pledge to maintain credit lines). The basic dynamic may be seen as a pos-
itive sum repeat game. Each institutional “player” knows the others, or
most of them, and knows that its own adherence to the joint endeavor will
aﬀect the other players’ future conﬁdence in its reliability.
Voluntary club-based collective action is sharply diﬀerent in eﬀect from
mandatory action imposed by the public sector, even though advocates of
the latter also frequently cite the private creditors’ own collective interest. It
is noteworthy that in neither the Korean nor Brazilian case was there legal
prohibition by the government of payment rather than rollover (or conver-
sion) of short-term claims, and in fact a number of smaller institutions did
elect to withdraw. A critical mass of support from larger ﬁrms was nonethe-
less successful. If instead there had been a comprehensive oﬃcial freeze on
payments, the results would have been radically diﬀerent, with the return to
capital markets greatly delayed.
It is also important to recognize that the positive impact on conﬁdence
from a voluntary collective action such as maintenance of credit lines can
be far greater than might be expected by the share of total debt directly
Creditor Relations 467comprised by the initiative in question. Thus, in the case of Korea, a debt of
$22 billion in short-term bank claims was converted, compared with Ko-
rea’s total external debt of $159 billion at the end of 1997. Similarly, short-
term trade and interbank claims of banks in Brazil were only about $25 bil-
lion by March 1999 when the banks entered into a voluntary arrangement
to maintain credit lines (IIF 1999a), compared with total external debt of
$259 billion at the end of 1998. However, in both cases the agreements to
stem short-term outﬂows were crucial catalysts to the rapid rebuilding of
conﬁdence. In part this is because much of the rest of the debt was at longer
term and could not immediately exit. The longer-term nature of bonds, in
particular, means that they are rarely the proximate cause of a sudden liq-
uidity crisis. More fundamentally, however, the initiatives, done on a quasi-
voluntary rather than mandatory basis, sent a strong signal that key private-
sector players had conﬁdence in the country’s longer-term prospects. This
signal helped restore conﬁdence more broadly.
Lender of Last Resort and Size of Oﬃcial Support
Another key issue is whether the large oﬃcial support programs of the
late 1990s were appropriate. Here the most useful conceptual premise is
Bagehot’s ([1873] 1917) rule for a central bank: in a panic, lend in unlimited
amounts to a solvent but illiquid bank; do not lend at all to an insolvent one.
Cline (2000b) proposes a “Bagehot curve” as guidance for public policy in
crisis resolution. On the vertical axis is the amount that can be provided in
oﬃcial support; on the horizontal axis is the probability that the country’s
situation is one of insolvency (ranging from zero to unity). Near the y-axis
(near-zero probability of insolvency) oﬃcial support can be extremely large
(for example, many times the usual IMF quota) under the Bagehot lender-
of-last-resort principle. As the probability of insolvency rises, the appropri-
ate amount of oﬃcial support drops rapidly.
By this gauge, the large oﬃcial support programs in a quasi-lender-of-last-
resort function were highly appropriate for Mexico, Korea, Thailand, and
Brazil. They were arguably more doubtful for Russia and even Indonesia, al-
though it warrants emphasis that neither IMF nor bilateral forgiveness has
occurred even in these cases despite defaults on private claims (although in
Indonesia defaults were only by private debtors). It should also be stressed
that the country’s underlying likelihood of assuring solvency, primarily by
forceful policy action, should be the appropriate guide to whether relatively
large oﬃcial support is made available—not the criterion of systemic impor-
tance. The latter (for example, as proposed by Council on Foreign Relations
[1999], which argues that in nonsystemic cases the IMF should “just say no”
to large packages) would discriminate against small countries. In short, there
is no room for ﬁnancial acrophobia in international ﬁnancial policy for cri-
sis resolution, even though policymakers need thick skins to withstand the
public backlash that typically accompanies big-ticket headline numbers.
A related question regarding the size of oﬃcial support is whether it
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swer would seem “surely not,” considering that these quotas were set at a
time when trade imbalances were the primary determinant of ﬁnancing
needs rather than today’s highly mobile capital ﬂows. It became particularly
evident in the case of Korea that the traditional IMF ﬁnancing magnitudes
of one to three times quota had become outdated, and the new Supplemen-
tary Reserve Facility (SRF) created in late 1997 made it possible for the IMF
to lend $21 billion to Korea, or more than nineteen times Korea’s quota.
The SRF, with its much larger and front-loaded lending capacity with high
and rising interest rates to encourage early repayment, is one of the most im-
portant concrete institutional changes to come out of the late 1990s’ ﬁnan-
cial crises. The likelihood of prompt repayment to the SRF (as occurred in
the cases of Korea and Brazil), moreover, means that the international ﬁ-
nancial community is likely to have available the resources to provide rela-
tively large temporary ﬁnancing in a crisis (except perhaps in a scenario in
which massive contagion once again envelopes a number of the largest
emerging market economies). Whether it will have the corresponding polit-
ical will is unclear, although this would seem more problematic for the
mounting of bilateral components of any future crisis management eﬀorts
than for the use in the IMF of the SRF and, perhaps, the Contingent Credit
Line (CCL), both of which were designed speciﬁcally for this purpose.
Voluntary Approaches to Private-Sector Involvement
In view of the conceptual framework outlined here, the fundamental
principle of private-sector involvement in crisis resolution is that it should
be on as voluntary and market-oriented a basis as possible in view of the cir-
cumstances. This will maximize the chances of a prompt return to private-
market access and limitation of public support to a temporary balance-
wheel role for restoring conﬁdence. Publicly mandated approaches, such as
involuntary standstills enforced by exchange controls, should be avoided
whenever possible, because they undermine the underlying dynamic of sov-
ereign lending by facilitating default and not only delay return to market ac-
cess but also risk adverse spillover to private lending to other countries
through heightened perceived risk.
Along the spectrum from voluntary to involuntary approaches, the cases
of Mexico in 1995, Korea in 1997–98, and Brazil in 1998–99 are toward (or,
for Mexico, at) the voluntary end; those for such countries as Ukraine and
Pakistan are toward the involuntary end; and the unilateral defaults of Rus-
sia and Ecuador are at the involuntary end. The discussion that follows re-
views in summary fashion the course of private-sector involvement in crisis
resolution in these and other cases.6The experience to date tends to conﬁrm
that more voluntary approaches generate more favorable outcomes for the
country itself and arguably for the system as well.
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6. For the cases of Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, also see Cline (1998).6.1.4 Resolving Liquidity Crises: Mexico, Thailand, Korea, Brazil
This section reviews the role of the private sector in achieving crisis reso-
lution in four major country episodes that together represent a class of cases
that involved potential systemic stakes and achieved relatively successful
outcomes on the basis of voluntary or quasi-voluntary private-sector in-
volvement. The discussion focuses primarily on how the private sector par-
ticipated in each case. The treatment is chronological, because there was a
learning-by-doing process at the international policy level, as well as a
changing political environment for policy options.
Mexico
A large current account deﬁcit (7 percent of GDP), two key political as-
sassinations in an election year, adherence to a nearly-ﬁxed exchange rate
regime, heavy reliance on short-term obligations in the government debt
structure, and considerable sterilization of capital outﬂows all played im-
portant roles in Mexico’s end-1994 crisis. It is questionable whether more
skilled management by the new economic team in December could have
averted the collapse.
The U.S. Treasury led an international program of oﬃcial support
amounting to $50 billion. The decision to do so undoubtedly reﬂected
recognition that otherwise the encouraging revival of emerging capital mar-
kets after the prolonged debt crisis of the 1980s and its tentative resolution
by the Brady Plan would be in serious jeopardy of collapse. The magnitude
of the package reﬂected the dimensions of the key variables capital markets
were focusing on at the time: some $30 billion due in short-term dollar-
indexed government obligations (tesobonos) against reserves that had
eroded to only about $6 billion.
Direct private-sector involvement in initial resolution of the crisis is easy
to describe in the Mexican case: there was none. U.S. Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin often stated in response to later critiques of the bailing out of
the private sector that if he could have found some way to make private
creditors pay some price without hurting Mexico, he would have done so.
However, the obligations in question were dispersed capital market hold-
ings, so the 1980s tactic of calling a London Club meeting of banks to
reschedule claims was irrelevant.7Importantly, Mexican policymakers were
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7. The London Club is an ad hoc arrangement of private creditors, historically primarily
commercial banks, that coordinates the negotiation of external debt restructurings with de-
veloping-country governments. Participation varies depending on the composition of expo-
sure in each case. Rieﬀel (1985, 4) identiﬁes the ﬁrst London Club rescheduling as that for
Zaire in the mid-1970s. London Club activity was particularly important in the Latin Ameri-
can debt restructurings of the 1980s. Typically negotiations were led by an advisory commit-
tee of leading banks. Today, with the sharp ascendance of bond lending, a growing issue is
whether the London Club process lends itself to extension to include representatives of bond-
holders.loath to repeat the August 1982 measure of a unilateral suspension of prin-
cipal payments. Mexico had simply paid too dearly in reestablishing its
credit reputation in the intervening decade to make that an attractive op-
tion at the end of 1994.
Some private-sector investors believed they had been penalized, because
they had held Mexican equities and peso-denominated government paper
(cetes) only on government assurances that there would be no devaluation.
Instead, the peso lost 35 percent of its value in December alone. Such
private-sector complaints did not take account of the rich interest rates that
had been earned on peso obligations (14–15 percent annually in 1993–94
while the peso had remained virtually unchanged against the dollar).
The private sector did eventually participate in Mexico’s crisis resolution,
by renewing inﬂows of capital after the devaluation and after tight mone-
tary policies began to take hold. Private ﬂows swung from –$4.8 billion in
1995 to $13.6 billion in 1996, primarily in direct investment and to some ex-
tent in bond ﬂows. Mexico was thus the ﬁrst case in the 1990s of successful
balance-wheel oﬃcial intervention that, along with forceful policy adjust-
ment, revived conﬁdence and a return of private capital.
Thailand
Thailand was the ﬁrst of the East Asian ﬁnancial crises of 1997–98. The
region’s crisis was marked by greater incidence of short-term bank claims
than in Mexico, where nonbank holdings of short-term government obli-
gations were the proximate problem. The relatively greater involvement of
banks in Asia reﬂected the fact that after the Latin American debt crisis,
banks had shied away from that region but had increasingly considered
lending to Asia relatively safe and promising in view of the region’s image
of sustained high growth. Thailand was the ﬁrst country where the growing
strains of rampant expansion became evident, including an increasingly
overextended domestic ﬁnancial system. Rapid domestic credit expansion
and an increasingly overvalued exchange rate (accompanied by a current
account deﬁcit of almost 8 percent of GDP) set the stage for a crisis.
By the second quarter of 1997 there was an increasing awareness that
Thailand had undertaken forward currency commitments that made its
eﬀective reserves far lower than the reported totals. Facing increasing pres-
sure on the baht, at the beginning of July the government allowed the cur-
rency to ﬂoat, ending its thirteen-year peg to the dollar. Within the month
the currency fell 22 percent, and it was destined to fall considerably further.
The crisis exposed the fragility of the domestic ﬁnancial system. The
greatest weakness was among some ninety ﬁnance companies, whose lend-
ing was concentrated in property, auto, and securities margin lending vul-
nerable to the sharp turnaround from rapid growth in the economy to re-
cession. The central bank suspended operations of sixteen ﬁnance
companies in June 1997 and of another forty in August.
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land centered in the restructuring of claims on these ﬁnance institutions.
These claims amounted to some $4 billion, only about 6 percent of total for-
eign claims (IIF 1999c, 65). The Thai government distinguished between ﬁ-
nancing companies, whose obligations were restructured, and commercial
banks, for which the government guaranteed obligations. For claims on the
sixteen ﬁnance companies closed in June, amounting to about half of
aﬀected foreign claims, creditors were entitled only to proceeds from auc-
tions of assets. For claims on the forty ﬁnance companies subsequently
closed, creditors were given ﬁve-year obligations on the main state bank at
2 percent interest.
In eﬀect, then, a relatively limited restructuring of only a small portion of
foreign claims—those on the suspended ﬁnance companies—was the only
direct involvement of the private sector in resolution of the Thai crisis. In
the case of Thailand, moreover, there continued to be a running down of
foreign bank claims during 1998 through 2000, primarily from conscious
deleveraging on the demand side rather than further contraction on that of
lending supply. These repayments were facilitated by a massive swing of the
current account from a deﬁcit of about 8 percent of GDP in 1996 to a sur-
plus of almost 13 percent in 1998.8
Because the Thai case involved only surgical rescheduling, it stands to-
ward the voluntary end of the spectrum of private-sector involvement in cri-
sis resolution. Although there is some support for a resulting reﬂow of vol-
untary capital in the fact that inﬂows of (mainly) direct and portfolio equity
more than doubled from 1996 to a range of about $7 billion annually in
1997–99, the persistence of net debt repayments after the crisis leaves the
case for renewed market access ambiguous so far.
For its part, the international oﬃcial support for Thailand was compli-
cated by the political backlash to the earlier U.S. oﬃcial support for Mex-
ico. The U.S. Congress had passed legislation prohibiting use of the trea-
sury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund for this purpose for a speciﬁed time
period after the Mexican package, and this time limit had not yet expired by
July 1997. In any event there appears to have been some oﬃcial sentiment
that whereas Mexico was primarily the United States’ problem, Thailand
was primarily that of Japan. By August, an international support program
had been assembled involving a total of $17 billion, with $3.9 billion from
the IMF, $1 billion each from the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank, $4 billion from Japan, and $6 billion from other governments. The
support and economic adjustment program contributed to economic re-
covery by 1999, but only after a severe recession (10 percent decline in
GDP) in 1998.
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8. Net bank ﬂows to Thailand fell from $13.4 billion in 1996 to –$6.9 billion in 1997, –$9.7
billion in 1998, and –$12.1 billion in 1999 (IIF database).Korea
By the time of the September 1997 IMF-World Bank meetings in Hong
Kong, there was a nervous relief in international ﬁnancial circles that Thai-
land’s crisis was being managed with little damage to the international
economy. There had been signiﬁcant declines in regional exchange rates (by
20–25 percent from the end of June to the end of September for Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, albeit only 3 percent for Korea), but there
was not yet a sense of severe regional crisis. Soon, however, the force of con-
tagion was to prove far more virulent than anticipated, as the largest and
most industrialized economy in the region was swept into the crisis.
Korea had already experienced signs of diﬃculty in the spring of 1997 as
problems from excess capacity and high corporate debt began to surface.
Some large corporate bankruptcies had begun to reveal the exposure of the
banking system. Korea’s earlier entry into the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), along with some ﬁnancial-sector
liberalization, had contributed to a sharp run-up in borrowing from foreign
banks. Short-term debt, in particular, had soared (from $39 billion at the
end of 1993 to $97 billion at the end of 1996; IIF 1999c, 89).
The incipient regional crisis brought an intensiﬁed focus of attention on
Korea and other major borrowers in the region. Through most of 1997 for-
eign lenders took comfort from the broad notion that the government was
capable of rendering support if needed, especially to the Korean banking
system. By the fourth quarter the uncertainty associated with the presiden-
tial election contributed to more pressure on the capital account. The most
severe blow, however, came in early December, when it was revealed that the
central bank had already committed the bulk of its reserves to foreign
branches of Korean banks. With usable oﬃcial reserves below $10 billion
and short-term external debt in the range of $100 billion, there was an acute
market realization that even if the Korean government wanted to support
external obligations of domestic banks or corporations, it might not have
the resources to do so. In the ﬁnal days of December there was thus an in-
cipient ﬁnancial meltdown even though the president-elect had committed
to undertaking a far-reaching IMF adjustment program (involving struc-
tural changes such as deleveraging by the highly indebted chaebol con-
glomerates).
Korea’s economy is so large, and its involvement in international trade
and ﬁnance so substantial, that its crisis qualiﬁed as one potentially posing
a systemic threat even under a stringent deﬁnition. Given the experience
with international oﬃcial support for Mexico, as well as that for Thailand,
it is not surprising that international oﬃcial support was thus soon mobi-
lized for Korea (and by this time the restrictions on the U.S. Exchange Sta-
bilization Fund had expired). The magnitude had to be large to be convinc-
ing, especially because ﬁnancial markets were highly focused on the large
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billion in oﬃcial support was thus assembled, with $21 billion from the
IMF, $14 billion from other multilateral sources, and $22 billion in “second
line of defense” funds available from U.S. and other bilateral sources. No-
tably, the IMF opened a new lending window (the Supplementary Reserve
Fund) to permit such large lending relative to Korea’s small IMF quota,
and it incorporated sizable and rising interest rates to provide a strong in-
centive for prompt repayment.
Announcement of the program by mid-December did not suﬃce to stem
capital market pressures, however, perhaps in part because only $14 billion
was to be available immediately. Reported reserves fell from $31 billion at
the end of October to $21 billion by the end of December, and usable re-
serves were much lower at some $6 billion. The government was no longer
able to hold its daily limit to the decline in the currency, and the won lost 31
percent of its value from the end of November to the end of December af-
ter having already lost a cumulative 22 percent during October and No-
vember.
It was in this crisis environment that U.S. policymakers and their Group
of Seven (G7) counterparts adopted a signiﬁcant shift in the crisis manage-
ment strategy of the late 1990s. They approached the major international
banks and conveyed the message that it was essential to halt the rapid runoﬀ
in short-term bank claims, or otherwise the whole program would be in
jeopardy.9 By early January the banks had agreed to hold short-term credit
lines for a period of three months, and discussions began on the conversion
of these claims into longer-term obligations. The announcement of the
short-term rollover initiative, combined with a surge in the monthly trade
balance from near zero in October-November to a surplus of $2 billion in
December, broke the momentum of the crisis, and as some measure of calm
returned the exchange rate partially reversed its sharp descent to appreciate
by 12 percent from the end of December to the end of January 1998.
By March the exchange of short-term claims was in place. Some $22 bil-
lion in short-term international bank claims on Korean banks was ex-
changed into one- to three-year bonds guaranteed by the government and
bearing spreads above U.S. Treasury interest rates for comparable maturi-
ties of 225 to 275 basis points above the London interbank oﬀer rate (LI-
BOR), considerably higher than the original terms but below market rates
at the time of the crisis. In eﬀect, this coordinated conversion of short-term
claims came the closest of any crisis management episode in the late 1990s
to the London Club reschedulings of bank claims on Latin America in the
1980s. This outcome was in part possible because much of Korea’s external
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9. It is not clear, however, that oﬃcials told banks there would be no more oﬃcial support
without a bank package, and indeed the oﬃcial package had already been constructed. Such
conditioning was much more explicit in the Latin American reschedulings with IMF support
in the 1980s.debt was to banks. At the end of 1996, 78 percent of external debt was owed
to banks and only 17 percent to bondholders and other nonbank private
creditors (IIF 2000b), making Korea something of a throwback to earlier
debt proﬁles in comparison with many other emerging market economies
by the late 1990s.
The conversion deal was de jure voluntary, because there was no legal re-
striction against running down rather than converting credit lines, and there
was no control limiting foreign exchange availability to repay short-term
loans. Some smaller banks did indeed run down lines rather than convert
them. The Korean negotiating position was viewed by the banks as tough,
although the government guarantee was an enhancement and by 1999 the
interest spreads on the conversion bonds again looked attractive. Overall,
the outcome was relatively balanced and, if not fully voluntary, at least
quasi-voluntary.
Brazil
In 1994 Brazil ended decades of increasingly high inﬂation by adopting a
successful stabilization program built around the anchor of a quasi-ﬁxed
exchange rate, the real.10 Underpinned by privatization, high real interest
rates, and some ﬁscal adjustment, the Real Plan succeeded in halting inﬂa-
tion but left Brazil by 1998 with an arguably overvalued exchange rate and
a relatively large current account deﬁcit (4.3 percent of GDP in a large
economy with a relatively modest export base). The strategy counted heav-
ily on increased productivity to validate the exchange rate. Whether this
would have worked in normal times is unclear, but in a context of global
contagion from East Asia and then from the Russian crisis in August 1998,
the strategy proved infeasible. From the end of June to the end of Septem-
ber reserves had fallen from $71 billion to $46 billion, and by January the
exchange rate had collapsed despite the mounting of a large oﬃcial support
program.
Like Korea, Brazil was clearly one of the emerging market economies
large enough to have a systemic impact. As market pressures mounted on
Brazil following the Russia shock, and once the presidential election was
safely won, the Cardoso government ﬁnally turned to the IMF for support
in October. Once again the international oﬃcial community assembled a
“show of force” package of $42 billion, comprising $18 billion from the
IMF, $9 billion from other multilateral sources, and $15 billion from the bi-
lateral sources. The G7 intervention to support Brazil was widely viewed as
drawing a line in the sand to halt global contagion at the borders of a coun-
try too important to lose.
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10. Initially set at parity to the dollar in June 1994 but without a ﬁxed-rate commitment, the
real promptly strengthened to 0.85 by September but in March depreciated to 0.90 under con-
tagion pressure from Mexico. Thereafter it crawled slowly at an annual average of about 7 per-
cent during 1996–98, within a minimal  0.5 percent band.The IMF-supported adjustment package was centered on ﬁscal adjust-
ment and notably did not break the existing exchange rate anchor. Al-
though the subsequent collapse of the real no doubt contributed to evolu-
tion in G7 policy against large interventions to support ﬁxed exchange
rates, it is easy to understand the rationale for the program at the time.
Brazil’s past experience had shown a large inﬂationary response to depreci-
ation of the exchange rate, and there were reasonable grounds for fearing
that ﬂoating the real would be an invitation to inﬂationary destabilization.
It is just conceivable that the program might have worked, but the proximate
cause of its demise was a domestic political unraveling in December when
a renegade state governor threatened to default on state debt.
After a brief attempt in early January to devalue modestly (8 percent) and
widen the band but slow the crawl, the government was forced to ﬂoat the
currency, and by the end of January it stood 40 percent below its end-
December level. It is a remarkable indicator of the subsequent success of
the Brazilian adjustment program that twenty months later the real was al-
most 15 percent stronger than at its trough at the end of February 1999.
Currency overshooting was curbed by tight monetary policy and ﬁscal ad-
justment, rather than being allowed to explode into a spiral of domestic in-
ﬂation and further depreciation, as many had forecast at the time. More-
over, in part because Brazil’s domestic banking system was relatively strong
(Brazilians insist with justiﬁcation that they experienced a currency crisis,
not a ﬁnancial crisis), Brazil’s economy did not plunge into deep recession
like those in the East Asian crises, although it experienced a second year in
a row of near-zero growth before rebounding to growth of about 4 percent
in 2000 as real interest rates fell sharply.
The story of private-sector involvement in resolving Brazil’s crisis is
highly illuminating on the delicate balance of conﬁdence and psychology
that permeates capital market relationships. Perhaps the most remarkable
aspect of this story is that Brazilian authorities from the start were ex-
tremely reluctant to become involved in any arrangement that had the ap-
pearance of a 1980s-type rescheduling or concerted lending operation. Like
Mexico, Brazil had simply paid too dearly during the 1980s to rebuild its
credit reputation and reenter capital markets to be willing to throw away the
credibility it had built up by suddenly putting the squeeze on creditors.
A luncheon for senior representatives of major banks in New York in No-
vember 1998, illustrates the point. At this event, organized by Citigroup’s
William Rhodes, a key ﬁgure in the restructuring programs of the 1980s and
early 1990s and in Korea’s 1998 loan conversion program, Brazilian Fi-
nance Minister Pedro Malan, and IMF Deputy Managing Director Stan-
ley Fischer set forth the new Brazilian program. At the end of the presenta-
tion, most participants expressed the willingness of their institutions to
hold credit lines. However, there was no explicit request by the Brazilian au-
thorities for them to do so in an organized fashion.
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Brazil was in acute currency crisis. Many analysts were convinced that
Brazil’s public debt was spiraling out of control. Continued payments pres-
sures had pushed currency overshooting even further (with the end-
February rate about 5 percent below that at the end of January). The time
had come when a crucial boost to conﬁdence was needed in the form of a
more organized response. In March, in conjunction with a revised IMF pro-
gram and in an environment in which a congress shocked by the currency
collapse had ﬁnally moved to take important ﬁscal measures, the interna-
tional banks agreed to a voluntary arrangement providing for the mainte-
nance of trade and interbank credit lines, amounting to some $25 billion.
There was some ambiguity in the extent of the arrangement, which some
announcements speciﬁed as holding through July but which some individ-
ual bank participants instead emphasized was strictly contingent on
Brazil’s meeting its policy obligations. Nonetheless, there was a strong
boost to conﬁdence from the signal that the international banks would hold
lines, and the currency began to regain some of its losses. Brazilian author-
ities coordinated with the IMF in maintaining updated data on exposure of
international banks, information that was communicated to national bank-
ing authorities, but it would appear that this process at most played an in-
formational role, giving some measure of assurance to banks in various
countries that their counterparts in other countries were continuing to
honor the initiative, rather than serving as a vehicle for heavy-handed en-
forcement by the oﬃcial sector.11 Once again there was no legal restriction
against banks’ running down their credit lines, nor any corresponding ex-
change controls. Once again, some of the smaller banks exited.
By April 1999 Brazil had begun a surprisingly prompt return to capital
markets. Several large Brazilian ﬁrms had reentered the international bond
market, and by the end of April the government had issued a sovereign Eu-
robond for $2 billion (at a spread of 675 basis points). Consider a counter-
factual in which instead Brazil, the IMF, and the G7 had all decided in Oc-
tober of 1998 that Brazil should ask its bondholders and bank creditors to
reschedule their claims, along the lines of 1980s debt reschedulings but this
time embracing some rescheduling of bonds, or an exchange operation for
them. It is almost inconceivable that if Brazil had chosen this course, it
would have been back to the market by April of 1999. Brazil is perhaps the
clearest case for the superiority of voluntary arrangements for private-
sector involvement in crisis resolution over dirigiste alternatives. Brazil’s
authorities were right to be highly reluctant all along to be seen as seeking
any type of a coercive rescheduling.
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11. Such information sharing has the property of overcoming the key obstacle to collective
action in the “prisoner’s dilemma” negative-sum game, the fact that each prisoner questioned
in isolation does not know whether his accomplice has confessed.6.1.5 Debt Workouts in More Severe Cases
Mexico, Korea, Brazil, and to a lesser extent Thailand serve as the clas-
sic cases for successful adjustment and restoration of conﬁdence and mar-
ket access, made possible by large oﬃcial intervention, forceful domestic
policy corrections, and (in Korea and Brazil) some arrangement for volun-
tary or quasi-voluntary private-sector participation. Some other conspicu-
ous cases have been less successful, largely because they were further to the
right along the horizontal axis (insolvency probability) of the Bagehot
curve. In some underlying sense the proper way to organize private-sector
involvement is less interesting in such cases, because from the private cred-
itor’s viewpoint this is broadly a question of “choosing one’s poison.” Most
of these cases involve some form of rescheduling or exchange of instru-
ments, and these involve a discontinuous breach of a key threshold in terms
of credit reputation rather than slightly more intense versions of the volun-
tary arrangements. Even so, there is interest in identifying what types of ap-
proaches may be less unfavorable than others. The common thread among
the workout cases is a more profound domestic political incoherence than
in the illiquidity cases discussed above, even though political strains played
important roles in those crises as well.
Indonesia
Although Indonesia had many ﬁnancial and macroeconomic distortions
of its own, its ﬁnancial crisis was sparked by contagion, as the country was
forced to let the exchange rate fall 14 percent in August 1997 one month af-
ter Thailand devalued. The crisis was slower to develop, but ultimately
much more profound than those of regional neighbors. Within a year the
currency had lost 85 percent of its value. Although a modicum of stability
had been restored by then, political disarray and recurrent bouts of cur-
rency instability have continued since. As an example of the salience of po-
litical factors, an exodus of capital of ethnic Chinese families and businesses
as the Suharto era came to a close was a major source of pressure. Similarly,
regional separatist strife, intense factionalism, and doubts about whether
Suharto-related interests will cede power peacefully have hindered restora-
tion of conﬁdence.
A key feature of Indonesia’s external debt was that the bulk of debt to
private creditors was owed by the domestic private sector: banks and cor-
porations.12 This meant that when domestic ﬁrms faced extreme losses, as
they did with the shocks from sharp currency devaluation and to some ex-
tent high interest rates, the question was not so much whether the Indone-
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12. At the end of 1997 the government owed $60 billion in external debt, but this was almost
all to oﬃcial sources ($19 billion multilateral, $41 billion bilateral). In contrast, domestic cor-
porations owed $66 billion, and banks owed $17 billion (IIF database).sian government would orchestrate a special arrangement (even though it
did) but whether foreign creditors could eﬀectively realize what was left of
their claims by pursuing domestic bankruptcy procedures. It soon became
evident that lax bankruptcy laws and, especially, enforcement, meant that
the latter course was not eﬀective.
In October 1997 the government abandoned its longtime policy of avoid-
ing IMF support and entered into an agreement providing a total of about
$34 billion, of which $10 billion was from the IMF, $8 billion from the
World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB), $5 billion from Japan
and Singapore, and $3 billion from the United States. By early 1998 the gov-
ernment was widely seen as not delivering on its policy adjustment com-
mitments, however, and instability intensiﬁed through May when Suharto
resigned. The policy slippage meant that by mid-1998 only about $4 billion
in oﬃcial disbursements had actually occurred (IIF 1999c, 54). In 1998
GDP fell by 13 percent.
Private-sector involvement in resolving the crisis was unlikely on a vol-
untary basis under these circumstances. One key government decision was
whether to guarantee domestic bank debt, including debt to foreign credi-
tors. After severe capital ﬂight following the closure of sixteen banks in No-
vember 1997 with minimal guarantee of depositors and creditors (a deci-
sion urged by the IMF, apparently in its concern to avoid the moral hazard
seen to have occurred in Thailand), the government was forced to guaran-
tee the rest of bank obligations.
Still, the bulk of private foreign claims was on corporations. Here, the
government made the key decision that it would not socialize the debt (un-
like the partial socialization of similar private obligations in Mexico in the
early 1980s under Fideicomiso para la Cobertura de Riesgos Cambiarios
[FICORCA]). Instead, it set up an umbrella organization for private debt
workouts (Jakarta Initiative and the Indonesian Debt Restructuring
Agency [INDRA]) oﬀering only a minimal mechanism for hedging ex-
change risk on repayments. Although in principle this detached posture was
unexceptionable and was consistent with minimizing moral hazard, when
applied in a sociojuridical context of minimal capacity for creditor bank-
ruptcy recovery, and following a government-sponsored temporary pause
in debt servicing in early 1998, the result in practice was widespread default
and prolonged arrears. Even so, about half of foreign claims on domestic
corporations were on subsidiaries of multinational ﬁrms, and this half has
largely been serviced. Of the other half, owed by Indonesian ﬁrms, the great
bulk still remains in default, despite frameworks providing for mediation
and some tax and other incentives for restructuring. The weakness of bank-
ruptcy mechanisms, and hence the lack of debtor incentive to reach agree-
ment, has been the basic reason.
With the eventual help of substantial foreign assistance, reduced politi-
cal uncertainty after presidential elections in the third quarter of 1999, and
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output by 1999 and returned to modest growth in 2000 (but with output still
far below 1997 levels). The environment of lingering defaults means, how-
ever, that rather than returning quickly to normal capital market access, In-
donesia has continued to face negative net ﬂows of bank and nonbank lend-
ing (IIF 2000a).
Russia
Russia’s crisis in August 1998 was much more the consequence of pro-
tracted failure to address structural economic distortions than a sudden liq-
uidity crisis precipitated by external contagion. A succession of IMF pro-
grams of economic adjustment and reform starting in 1992 had failed to
address the core problems of chronic ﬁscal weakness, large capital ﬂight,
weak property rights, and dominant inﬂuence of interest groups (“oli-
garchs”). Foreign investors had nonetheless pursued the high returns in ru-
ble treasury bills (GKOs) and a surging stock market through mid-1997, in
part because of the belief that G7 governments could not aﬀord politically
to let Russia fail. Increasingly these returns, and especially IMF programs
premised on continued private foreign ﬁnancing of large ﬁscal deﬁcits, had
“Ponzi scheme” characteristics of unsustainability. Thus, by mid-1998
treasury bills were yielding over 60 percent even though the oﬃcial ex-
change rate crawl was minimal.
Pressure on Russia began to mount in the fourth quarter of 1997 as some
contagion from East Asia did contribute to a decline in equity and govern-
ment bond prices, and by the ﬁrst half of 1998, a drop in oil prices aggra-
vated prospects. It became increasingly doubtful that the government
would be able to roll over its short-term external debt, which was more than
twice as large as external reserves. In July a new IMF agreement was
reached, providing for $17 billion in support, but even the ﬁrst tranche was
curtailed because the Duma had failed to pass key ﬁscal reforms. Some in
private markets also doubted the seriousness of the program, in part be-
cause it delayed ﬁscal adjustment until the following year and was premised
on continuation of private capital inﬂows. As capital market pressures con-
tinued, Russian authorities sought additional support, but G7 authorities
were unprepared to do more because of the absence of a suﬃcient Russian
political consensus for reform. In mid-August the government devalued the
ruble, unilaterally restructured its domestic (GKO) debt, suspended pay-
ments (and soon defaulted) on former Soviet debt (which had already been
rescheduled in 1997), and froze payments on private-sector external debt
and forward exchange contracts.
The workout that followed was lengthy and often acrimonious. The gov-
ernment seemed to give preferential treatment to domestic holders of
GKOs, for example, by allowing domestic banks to use them as collateral
against new loans from the central bank. By mid-1999 negotiations had de-
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structure from the past somewhat extended to include investment banks.
Such ﬁnancial institutions as asset managers and mutual funds, which held
a sizable amount of the obligations, were not at the negotiating table.
Russia reached agreement with the London Club by early 2000, in a con-
text of increased political cohesion with the replacement of Mr. Yeltsin by
Mr. Putin, and on the strength of the sharp upswing in world oil prices and
hence Russia’s ﬁscal prospects. The present value of former Soviet debt was
cut by about 30 percent (but upgraded to government debt instead of obli-
gations by Sberbank). Critics of the process pointed to the lengthy negotia-
tions that had been required. However, the negotiation process did require
that the Russian authorities formally take into account the views of the
creditors, or at least some of them. In contrast, the “unilateral exchange
oﬀers” in other recent cases (Ukraine, Ecuador) did not do so.
By the third quarter of 2000, Russia’s economy had shown surprising
strength, with GDP likely to grow 6 percent or more for the year. Spurred
by import substitution, growth the previous year had reached 3 percent, fol-
lowing the economy’s 5 percent decline in 1998. Russia also managed to
avoid the hyperinﬂation some had feared in the event of devaluation and de-
fault, as a consequence of severe wage compression, a freeze in utility
prices, tight economic policy, and the fact that a collapse of domestic banks
contributed to curbing the money supply. The economy’s recovery in 2000
was closely linked to that of oil prices, however. Large capital ﬂight has con-
tinued (at rates of $20–25 billion annually in 1998–2000), and net private
capital inﬂows—which reached a peak of $37 billion in 1997—collapsed to
near zero by 1999 and less than $2 billion (mainly direct investment) in
2000. Although more fundamental factors such as insuﬃcient enterprise
restructuring would have constrained Russia’s economic performance in
any event, tougher conditions on earlier international support to prompt
faster reform and—especially—a more cooperative approach to external
debt restructuring might have left Russia in a much stronger economic po-
sition, and one much less dependent on strong oil prices.
There is little doubt that Russia’s default in August 1998 marked a nega-
tive watershed for emerging markets more generally. For the ﬁrst time in the
decade, a major emerging market economy defaulted and sought sovereign
debt forgiveness, rather than merely entering a period of illiquidity and tak-
ing forceful adjustment measures to restore conﬁdence. The spillover is ev-
ident in lending spreads. Thus, the JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond In-
dex (EMBI ) index of spreads on Latin American bonds, which stood at
about 500 basis points in mid-1998, surged to 1,500 basis points in August
1998 with Russia’s crisis and did not fall below 1,000 basis points until No-
vember 1999 (IIF database).
As for lessons from Russia for private-sector involvement, the main one
was that even geopolitical salience was no assurance against collapse. Any
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biguous. A more fundamental lesson is that the most certain way to assure
private-sector involvement in crisis resolution—unilateral default—is also
the worst way to do so, if the country seeks early reentry to capital markets.
Ecuador
Ecuador’s persistent political problems were not unlike those of Indone-
sia and Russia. One president was ousted by the legislature in 1997 on
grounds of “mental incapacity”; another was deposed in a brief military
coup in early 1999. There have been sharp political divisions among inte-
rior (“altiplano”), coastal, and indigenous-group interests. In the past two
years, there have been four diﬀerent ﬁnance ministers.
Spillover from Russia in late 1998 compounded Ecuador’s economic diﬃ-
culties that year from El Niño weather damage as well as low commodity
prices. A growing ﬁscal deﬁcit and legislative resistance to ﬁscal correction
added to the adverse investment climate. As external credit dried up, the cur-
rency depreciated sharply, external reserves fell about two-thirds from mid-
1998 to early 1999, and interest rates reached 80 percent and more (com-
pared to inﬂation that reached about 40 percent). With increasing problems
in the banking sector, by March 1999 the government froze bank deposits.
It was in this environment of economic unraveling that the IMF appears
to have chosen to make Ecuador a guinea pig13 for a more aggressive ap-
proach to bailing in private creditors. There had been escalating political
pressure within industrial countries to stop bailing out private creditors,
and the public sector appears to have been tempted to try out new ap-
proaches on smaller countries where the systemic consequences would be
limited if the outcome proved adverse.
Arguably, Ecuador might have been able to avoid default on Brady and
Eurobonds. Out of $1.7 billion in principal due on public-sector external
debt over 2000–01, only $38 million was payable on Brady bonds and none
on Eurobonds (Ecuador 2000, 83). Of the $1.5 billion due in interest, $606
million was payable on Brady bonds and $110 million on Eurobonds. Thus,
these two sources of private claims comprised only 23 percent of public ex-
ternal debt service due over this period. In contrast, principal and interest
payments to the IMF and other multilaterals accounted for 54 percent, and
those owed to governments represented 16 percent. Debt service to com-
mercial banks and on suppliers’ credits comprised the remaining 7 percent.
Public debt service due on Brady and Eurobonds in 2000–01 amounted
to only about 6 percent of prospective earnings on exports of goods and
services, and a forceful adjustment program coupled with IMF support and
Paris Club relief might have suﬃced to turn around private investor conﬁ-
dence. However, by the second quarter of 1999, Ecuadoran authorities ap-
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13. This is the term one of the more senior members of the board of directors of the IMF
used in private discussions more than a year later.pear to have been under the impression that IMF and Paris Club support
would only be forthcoming under circumstances in which Brady and Eu-
robond payments were also restructured.14In terms of what is on the public
record, in eﬀect the IMF blessed the concept by approving in principle a
September 1999 standby agreement with Ecuador that was premised on the
cash-ﬂow outlook that included the restructuring of these instruments.
The notion of restructuring Brady bonds seemed curious at the time. It in-
volved questions of equity, considering that holders had already forgiven 40
percent of their original claims when Ecuador reached a Brady deal with for-
eign banks in 1995. It also raised questions of public-sector memory, consid-
ering that the instrument itself had been designed to resolve the 1980s debt
problem through a promise of exchanging a new secure instrument for ear-
lier bank claims, trading oﬀpart of the claim in return for the reduced risk.15
The oﬃcial sector’s decision to sanction Ecuador’s default and restructuring
of Bradies represented, consciously or otherwise, a decision to exterminate
this type of instrument as a credible option for use in future crises.
At the end of August 1999 Ecuador did default on part of its Brady debt,
and a prompt move by holders to “accelerate” quickly derailed the hope
that this debt could for a time be serviced out of its rolling interest collat-
eral, with the eﬀect of escalating the default to all types of Brady debt as well
as Eurobond debt. In part because Ecuador’s economic policies were in dis-
array and the IMF program was delayed, far from enjoying a respite, the
country experienced an intensifying economic crisis. By March, 2000 the
new ﬁnance minister had declared the decision to default a “catastrophic
error” (Reuters Market News Service, 28 March 2000).
The impact on emerging markets more broadly was modest at worst, al-
though the default did appear to widen the spread between Brady bond
spreads and those on other obligations. In broad terms, the capital markets
treated Ecuador as a quarantined case rather than a harbinger for such
countries as Brazil and Argentina. Nonetheless, the episode has left a sour
taste among many in the private sector that has curbed the appetite for lend-
ing to countries where there could be “international ﬁnancial institution
risk” because of potential Paris Club pressure for comparability or IMF
pressure for private rescheduling where multilateral claims bulk large.16
The particular workout modality eventually chosen by Ecuador, once it
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14. Based on numerous discussions, including one with a ministerial-level Ecuadoran oﬃ-
cial.
15. Brady bonds typically forgave 35–40 percent of original claims, in exchange for a thirty-
year bullet principal guarantee using U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds as collateral, along
with collateral against twelve to eighteen months’ interest due. The collateral has typically
been in escrow with the New York Federal Reserve Bank.
16. Referring to the recent “bail-in risk,” a representative of a major asset management com-
pany stated to the 2000 Annual Membership Meeting of the Institute of International Finance
that his institution was no longer willing to undertake exposure in countries where IMF and
Paris Club claims are relatively large, and observed that the heightened risk from oﬃcial bail-
in pressure had done major damage to second-tier emerging market economies.had made the decision to default, was the unilateral exchange oﬀer. In this
approach, the country and its investment banking advisors informally take
soundings of major holders of the bonds in question to arrive at an oﬀer
they consider to have a good chance of being accepted by a critical mass of,
say, 85 percent or more. This “exchange of instruments” circumvents the ar-
ray of diﬃculties likely to be involved in an attempt to enter into negotia-
tions with bondholders on rescheduling the obligations due under the ex-
isting instruments.
In Ecuador’s case, the exchange oﬀer was designed “to provide partici-
pants with a signiﬁcant pick-up in market value over the current trading
prices of their Existing Bonds” (Ecuador 2000, 3).17It involved a 40 percent
cut in the face value of Brady bonds, but with a signiﬁcant oﬀset of a par-
tial immediate cash payment. Thus, $3.9 billion in new bonds (mostly
thirty-year), plus cash payments of about $1 billion (of which about one-
third was of arrears), were exchanged for $6.6 billion in (mainly) Brady and
Eurobonds.
Although the exchange oﬀer was well received, in that some 97 percent of
holders accepted (well above the 85 percent threshold sought by the gov-
ernment), questions remain about this modality. Some substantial institu-
tional holders of the bonds were not consulted in the preparation of the ex-
change oﬀer. Like other exchange oﬀers, it was essentially “preemptive” in
nature, with only two weeks allowed for bondholders to respond to the
oﬀer. In such circumstances there is a take-it-or-leave-it dynamic that tends
to make the high incidence of acceptance somewhat misleading as an indi-
cation of creditor attitude.
By the time of the exchange, Ecuador had made a somewhat more prom-
ising start on its program of dollarization than might have been expected,
and a new IMF program had been adopted (in April). Including other mul-
tilateral lending, the support program amounted to $2 billion over three
years, or 14 percent of one year’s GDP. High oil prices have also helped the
economy. However,  unless the country’s internal political environment
shifts toward greater coherence, making possible more sustained ﬁscal ad-
justment and progress on banking-sector and other structural reforms,
Ecuador could face renewed diﬃculties despite the debt restructuring and
oﬃcial support. For their part, private creditors would seem unlikely to re-
turn to the country soon, having been burned twice.
Pakistan, Romania, Ukraine
Three other recent cases warrant review as instances in which the public
sector has pressed governments to restructure obligations to private credi-
tors, or otherwise to press them to participate in crisis resolution.
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17. In the event, market prices of Ecuador’s Brady bonds rose on average by about 20 per-
cent following announcement of the oﬀer.In early 1999 the Paris Club told Pakistan that its comparability of treat-
ment principle would require that Pakistan restructure its sovereign bonds
in order to obtain rescheduling of bilateral debt. These included a total of
about $600 million in notes due in 1999 through 2000. At the time there was
concern that this prospective ﬁrst instance of Eurobond rescheduling
would cast a severe pall on the international bond market. As it turned out,
Ecuador’s default preceded Pakistan’s exchange oﬀer. Although both prob-
ably had some adverse eﬀect on international bond markets, the eﬀect was
at most modest.
In November 1999, Pakistan oﬀered to exchange its bonds for others to
mature in 2002–05, bearing 10 percent interest. More than 95 percent of
holders accepted the exchange oﬀer by the closing date in late December.
One reason for the favorable response is likely to have been that the ex-
change did not seek forgiveness.
Pakistan’s use of the exchange oﬀer modality was informative, because its
bonds were under U.K. law and so could have been rescheduled with con-
sent of a qualiﬁed (high) majority of holders. In contrast, bonds under U.S.
law typically require unanimous consent. As discussed below, the issue of
requiring qualiﬁed majority rescheduling clauses in bonds has been one of
the more prominent in the debate on involving the private sector; yet it
seems to have been irrelevant in actual practice in the Pakistan case.
Romania managed with great eﬀort (exchange rate depreciation and ﬁs-
cal tightening that induced resident capital reﬂows) to pay oﬀ some $700
million in Eurobonds due in the second quarter of 1999. However, the IMF
program that restarted in July of that year had as a condition that the coun-
try mobilize $450 million in new private-sector inﬂows. This was not in the
context of Paris Club comparability, because Paris Club debt was small and
there was no rescheduling in prospect. Instead, the condition reﬂected the
intensifying pressure at the time for inducing private-sector “burden shar-
ing.”
After the release of an initial tranche of about $80 million, the IMF pro-
gram was suspended in September because Romania only managed to
arrange about $100 million in a one-year club loan from fourteen banks, far
below the target, and also because of disagreement on the 2000 budget.
However, by June 2000 the IMF agreement was renewed, with the IMF cit-
ing “the large reduction in the current account deﬁcit [and] the sharp cor-
rection in the ﬁscal deﬁcit” as grounds for the reinstatement of the $535 mil-
lion standby program. At the same time, the government paid oﬀ the club
loan of June 1999 and announced it would also pay oﬀanother club loan of
$64 million dating from December 1999.18 Repayment without announce-
ment of other new initiatives for private support signaled that the new IMF
agreement was no longer conditioned on a burden-sharing target for
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18. Data from Reuters: Rompres news agency 13 June 2000; Rompres 27 June 2000.private-sector involvement. This may have represented a straw in the wind
indicating that the IMF considered its series of small-country experiments
in this direction during the preceding year as less than successful.
In early 2000 in the face of a severe external payments problem reﬂecting
in part persistent ﬁscal imbalance, Ukraine suspended payments on its ex-
ternal debt except that owed to multilateral institutions and announced its
intention to restructure debt to private and bilateral creditors. In early Feb-
ruary the government announced an exchange oﬀer to convert $2.8 billion
in bonds falling due in 2000–01 into new bonds with seven years’ maturity
and two years’ grace and bearing 10–11 percent interest. The oﬀer gave
holders until mid-April to respond. The response was favorable and met the
85 percent threshold.
Workout Lessons
The ﬁrst feature that stands out in the list of workout cases just reviewed
is that, in contrast to the four success cases examined in the previous sec-
tion, underlying economic strength and creditworthiness were generally far
weaker. This amounts to an informal empirical veriﬁcation of the Bagehot
curve notion relating intervention policy to illiquidity versus insolvency:
large, temporary oﬃcial lending works to restore conﬁdence when under-
lying creditworthiness is strong and the problem is a transitory shock; the
opposite outcome of forced rescheduling is likely to be unavoidable where
underlying creditworthiness is weak.
Table 6.2 provides evidence that supports the intuitive sense that the list
of debt reschedulers and bond exchangers is populated by weaker
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Table 6.2 Institutional Investor Country Risk Rating
Country Date Rating Global average
Mexico Sept. 1994 46.1 37.5
Thailand Mar. 1997 61.1 40.1
Korea Sept. 1997 69.7 41.0
Brazil Sept. 1998 38.0 41.1
Average 53.7 n.a.
Indonesia Mar. 1997 51.6 40.1
Russia Mar. 1998 31.2 41.2
Ecuador Mar. 1999 25.5 40.1
Pakistan Mar. 1999 20.4 40.1
Romania Mar. 1999 31.2 40.1
Ukraine Sept. 1999 18.7 41.5
Average 29.8 n.a.
Source: Institutional Investor, various issues. Average rating for all countries included in Insti-
tutional Investor annual surveys.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.economies than the list of countries that achieved a quick turnaround with-
out major rescheduling. The table reports the country risk rating of the
economy in question in the most recent semiannual compilation of the
magazine Institutional Investorprior to the ﬁnancial crisis in question. Run-
ning from zero to 100 (and with the United States rated typically at about
93), these ratings are based on a weighted survey of approximately 100
banks, asset management companies, and economists.
As expected, the average rating for the four success cases of major inter-
national support stands considerably higher, at 53.7, than that for the six
workout cases,19 at 29.8. The only anomaly is the case of Indonesia, whose
relatively high rating probably represents the fact that many of the Institu-
tional Investor survey respondents were referring to sovereign rather than
general country risk, and Indonesia has not defaulted on its sovereign debt.
A crucial lesson from this dichotomy between two classes of country
crises is that policymakers should not conﬂate workout-type solutions with
market-resilient countries. Remedies that oﬃcials consider appropriate for
an Ecuador would likely be inappropriate for a Brazil, because Ecuador’s
problem was much closer to insolvency than Brazil’s, which was closer to
illiquidity.
Among the workout experiences, an important pattern that seems to be
emerging is the debtor preference for the “unilateral exchange oﬀer” over
rescheduling of the existing instrument, at least where the debt is primarily
in bonds. In this approach the debtor “oﬀers” to exchange a newly created
obligation in exchange for the existing claims. At least in principle, the
holder of the existing claim is not obliged to accept the new substitute in-
strument, but in practice the terms are set to make it likely that a large crit-
ical mass of existing claimholders will judge it prudent to accept the ex-
change instrument rather than holding out in hopes of forcing payment of
the original claim instead. (This leaves ambiguity about whether a minority
of holders refusing the exchange oﬀer can collect on the original terms, and
correspondingly leaves a risk of lawsuits by such holders.) Pakistan,
Ecuador, and Ukraine used the approach of the exchange oﬀer to swap new
instruments for outstanding bonds. Russia used the alternative approach of
a London Club negotiation, but much of its debt in question was to banks.
The remarkable speed with which the unilateral exchange oﬀers have
been completed shows that there is a major historical diﬀerence between
dealing with bond defaults today and in the last major episode—the 1930s.
Electronic communication today means it is easy to obtain prompt replies
from thousands of bondholders, whereas lengthy delays were a problem in
the 1930s.
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19. Romania is not technically a workout case because it did not reschedule or exchange, but
it is classed with the workout group here because it too was subject to an international oﬃcial
attempt at enforcement of private-sector burden sharing.A potentially serious problem with the unilateral exchange oﬀer, how-
ever, is that so far it does not seem to have been implemented in a manner
that provided for widespread consultation with major holders. To some ex-
tent the risks associated with the lack of consultation have been mitigated
by making the oﬀer more attractive than terms consistent with the going
secondary-market price. However, lack of consultation would seem to in-
crease the eventual risk of lawsuits. It is too early to tell whether legal chal-
lenges will prove to be a drawback of the unilateral exchange oﬀers.
One aspect of the rapid acceptance of the exchange oﬀers has perhaps
been that much of the debt in question had already been sold oﬀ to vulture
funds and other speculative investors. For them, any increase in the terms
from the secondary-market price equivalent might have been viewed as at-
tractive. In terms of policy, however, it would be inappropriate to give much
emphasis to this consideration as a basis for judging exchange oﬀers (espe-
cially those involving forgiveness) as favorable outcomes. Essentially, the
fulﬁllment of the obligation should be judged against its original value, not
against the level to which it has fallen under distress.
Another pattern seems to be that the quarantine eﬀect has dominated the
contagion eﬀect of small-country bond restructuring on the international
capital market. There had been legitimate concern by mid-1999 that the
oﬃcial sector’s seeming insistence on bond rescheduling in Pakistan and
Ecuador would cause severe adverse spillover to the bond market generally
for emerging market economies, because as a class bonds had not yet en-
tered into signiﬁcant restructurings. This de facto exempt status had re-
ﬂected the small portion of debt owed in bonds in the Latin American debt
crisis of the 1980s and, hence, the practice in that episode of rescheduling
bank claims but not bonds. As it turned out, the Ecuadorian default and
Pakistan’s exchange did not cause a sudden and severe fallout for emerging
market bonds globally. However, as suggested above, the persistence of rel-
atively high bond spreads suggests that the oﬃcial-sector pressure that con-
tributed to the spread of restructuring to bonds may have slowed the pace
of recovery in emerging capital markets.
The seeming ease of bond exchanges also contradicts the great concern
in much of the debate on crisis resolution about the need for changes in oﬃ-
cial practice and even legal structure to deal with what had been perceived
as severe obstacles to bond rescheduling, including such mechanisms as col-
lective action clauses in bonds and “stay of litigation” powers for the IMF.
These issues are addressed brieﬂy below.
6.1.6 Rules, Case-by-Case Determination, and Principles
One of the central issues in international policy on private-sector in-
volvement in crisis resolution has been the debate on whether there should
be clearly codiﬁed rules about how the private sector should participate,
488 William R. Clinewhat the public sector will be prepared to do, and whether each episode
should be handled on a case-by-case basis. Broadly, the Canadians and Eu-
ropeans have tended to favor a rules-based approach, and U.S. authorities
have tended to favor the case-by-case approach.
The search for rules of crisis resolution seems primarily to reﬂect the po-
litical backlash against what appeared to be large public support programs
that bailed out private creditors. The type of rules that some in the oﬃcial
sector seem to have in mind are of the following sort: IMF and oﬃcial sup-
port should not exceed normal magnitudes of, say, two or three times IMF
quota; private creditors should reschedule if the Paris Club reschedules;
private creditors should somehow contribute new money, or at least not be
receiving net repayments, when public lending is taking place; and so forth.
There is an inherent problem in spelling out rules for private- and public-
sector involvement in crisis resolution, which is essentially the problem of
“time inconsistency.” The crux of the problem is that rigidly preannounced
policies may adversely distort future behavior, even if those particular poli-
cies might be appropriate to apply in an actual contemporaneous event. In
central banking, for example, authorities are loath to spell out in a precod-
iﬁed set of rules that they will (or will not) support banks that are “too big
to fail.” If they speciﬁcally say they will do so, the result will be a marginal
distortion toward ever larger and fewer banks. If they speciﬁcally say they
will not do so, they encounter a problem of credibility loss when and if they
do so in practice. Thus, it is diﬃcult to imagine an eﬀective set of rules writ-
ten in advance that would have authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to press large institutions to support Long-Term Capital Man-
agement in 1998 lest its collapse severely destabilize markets.
In short, rules will tend to be unduly constraining or send potentially per-
verse signals aﬀecting future behavior. In contrast, debt crisis resolution has
traditionally been handled on a case-by-case basis. This was the watchword
of debt strategy in the 1980s, even if de facto a great majority of the case out-
comes wound up looking very much like each other. A case-by-case strat-
egy meant nothing was guaranteed, but nothing was excluded. Its frame-
work allows for the “constructive ambiguity” that is helpful in central
banking intervention.
A rules-oriented strategy could also undermine the Eaton-Gersovitz con-
ditions for sovereign lending. If the rules book turned out to look like a rel-
atively accommodating oﬃcial framework for sovereign default, the conse-
quences might be a few rounds of relatively comfortable defaults followed
by a long stretch of minimal capital ﬂows to emerging markets.
The appropriate resolution of this policy debate would seem to lie in
recognition that (a) the case-by-case approach is inescapable; (b) it should
nonetheless be applied within a broad framework of principles; and (c)
eﬀorts to spell out “rules” applying these principles are likely to be subject
to the time-inconsistency problem and should be avoided.
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tion that are most likely to be successful in restoring and maintaining capi-
tal market access would seem to include the following broad precepts.20
First, private-sector participation should be on as voluntary and market-
oriented a basis as possible given the circumstances. Second, optimal
public-sector involvement may sometimes involve much larger, temporary
support than traditionally envisioned in IMF programs and can appropri-
ately be extended at higher lending prices (as in the IMF’s new SRF). Third,
a judgment of the country’s position along a continuum between a pure liq-
uidity problem, on the one hand, and a fundamental insolvency problem,
on the other, should be the main determinant of whether large temporary
oﬃcial support is oﬀered or whether instead primary reliance is placed on
restructuring private-sector claims. Fourth, no one type of private claims
(such as bonds) should automatically enjoy exempt or senior status, al-
though such factors as whether the claims have already been restructured
(e.g., Brady bonds) or whether their disruption would undermine economic
activity (e.g., trade credits) should be taken into account in designing an eq-
uitable and eﬀective restructuring package. Fifth, private creditors bear re-
sponsibility for their own risks and do not expect the public sector to make
good their losses. Sixth, however, the public sector should act forcefully
when it is in a position to orchestrate a positive-sum outcome that beneﬁts
the economies in question and helps minimize creditor losses (and maxi-
mize chances of return to voluntary capital markets) at no or minimal ex-
pected cost to taxpayers. Seventh, where debt restructuring is unavoidable,
the sovereign obligor should consult fully with the creditors.
Other principles can no doubt be added. In evaluating either principles
or more detailed rules, it is important to go through the counterfactual ex-
ercise of seeing whether the global economy (and that of the country in
question) would have been well served if the proposed approaches had been
enforced in each of the major crisis episodes of the recent years. It would be
counterproductive to adopt for the future rules that would have made
things worse in the past, because similar episodes could once again confront
policymakers, who would then be forced to choose between disregarding
the rules and causing suboptimal outcomes.
6.1.7 Further Considerations
This paper has outlined the evolving structure of emerging capital mar-
kets, set forth the conceptual framework for policy toward involvement of
the private sector in crisis resolution, reviewed the major crisis episodes of
the late 1990s as well as the spate of more recent small-country workouts,
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20. Also see IIF (2001), issued subsequent to the preparation of this paper.and considered patterns as well as implications for the debate on rules ver-
sus case-by-case approaches. A handful of speciﬁc issues warrant further
comment to complement this review.
Future Evolution of Lending Structure
There are increasing signs that the shift in emerging markets lending from
banks toward bonds will continue. It is telling that even if the crisis
economies are excluded (ﬁve East Asian economies, Russia, and Brazil), net
bank lending to the other emerging market economies plunged from about
$30 billion annually in 1996–97 to close to zero in 1998–2000 (Cline 2000a).
In contrast, net bond and other nonbank lending to the noncrisis
economies held up well, at an average of about $35 billion annually in 1998–
2000 compared to about $43 billion in 1996–97. Similarly, the most recent
forecasts of the IIF (2000a) place nonbank ﬂows to major emerging market
economies still ahead of net bank ﬂows in 2001 (at $36 billion versus $16 bil-
lion, respectively), even though the rebound of the latter will ﬁnally turn
them positive after three years of negative net ﬂows.
There are two structural reasons why this shift may continue. First, in-
creasingly the large international banks appear to be concluding that share-
holder value is better served by concentrating on fee-based income of an in-
vestment-bank nature (e.g., helping launch and sell securities) than by
traditional balance sheet lending. Although not limited to emerging mar-
kets, this phenomenon contributes to the shift away from bank claims to-
ward bonds in these markets. Second, the inherently high leverage of banks
(whose Tier 1 equity capital is only 4 percent of risk-weighted assets under
the existing Basel rules) makes them potentially more subject to retrench-
ment in sectors where risk is perceived to have increased than is the case for
less leveraged investors. The interaction of the escalation of perceived risk
in emerging markets lending with the degree of leverage may help explain
why bank lending to the noncrisis emerging market economies fell oﬀmuch
more than did nonbank (mainly bond) lending in recent years. As the
heightened perception of emerging markets risk seems unlikely to disap-
pear soon, the leverage consideration could continue to constrain bank
lending to these markets.
Despite this likely evolution, banks could continue to play a key role in
helping resolve short-term liquidity crises through initiatives to maintain
credit lines, as in the Korean and Brazilian cases. The share of banks in
short-term debt (including trade credit) is likely to remain considerably
higher than their share in longer-term debt, and, as noted, the longer-term
repayments owed to bondholders do not tend to be the proximate problem
in short-term liquidity crises. Continued evolution toward bonds would,
however, increase their role in the resolution of more intransigent crises
where longer-term restructuring is necessary.
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This in turn raises the by now familiar issue of whether public policy
should require the inclusion of “collective action” or rescheduling clauses
in bonds, to facilitate their restructuring if needed. Some (e.g., Portes 2000)
have emphasized that this is the key reform needed in emerging markets
lending.
Recent experience seems to suggest, however, that the traditional argu-
ments for this reform may no longer be compelling. Prompt communica-
tion to numerous, dispersed holders has eﬀectively been carried out in the
bond exchanges, suggesting that technology has superseded some of the in-
formational and organizational problems of the past in bond restructuring.
The exchange oﬀers have also not been held up by rogue bondholders, and
the approach of providing a new instrument in exchange for the existing
bond appears so far to have successfully circumvented the diﬃcult chal-
lenges that would have to be overcome in formal rescheduling discussions
even where a qualiﬁed majority rather than unanimity is required.
There thus would seem to remain considerable weight on the main rea-
son to avoid an international regime of mandatory rescheduling clauses for
emerging market bonds: Generalized adoption of such clauses could con-
vey the impression that the international oﬃcial community would lean to-
ward facilitating default when diﬃculties arise. This would tend to under-
mine the Eaton-Gersovitz dynamic of default pain as quasi-collateral and
hence curb ﬂows of new bond lending and increase spreads.21 Instead, the
ﬂexibility provided by qualiﬁed majority bond rescheduling clauses could
be obtained by those sovereigns that chose to include such clauses, probably
initially at a spreads premium.22
For the same conceptual reason, incorporation into the IMF’s Articles
the authority to impose a stay of litigation, as suggested by former IMF
Managing Director Michel Camdessus, would tend to undermine emerging
capital markets. This innovation too would send a signal that default could
be facilitated by the oﬃcial sector. The same problem is inherent in most
proposals to create some type of international agency to provide at the in-
ternational level bankruptcy workouts analogous to those present domesti-
cally. Such proposals typically fail to recognize the fundamental diﬀerence
between bankruptcy recovery potential where there is tangible collateral
and where there is not.
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21. See Cline (2000b) for an interpretation of the results of Eichengreen and Mody (2000)
that concludes their empirical tests on U.S.- versus U.K.-issued bonds should not alter this
view.
22. The call to G7 countries to include rescheduling clauses in their own sovereign bonds as
a means of removing any special stigma to emerging market governments’ doing so seems
highly unrealistic and would be especially troublesome for such countries as Japan, where
public debt has escalated sharply relative to GDP.Contingent Lending Arrangements
One of the instruments that at ﬁrst looked promising as a mechanism for
involving the private sector in crisis resolution has made little progress in
the past three years: contingent lending arrangements. Under such arrange-
ments, the country pays a commitment fee for assured access to credit up to
an agreed amount in the event that the country wishes to draw on the credit.
Mexico and Argentina have been the most conspicuous cases of such
arrangements, but Mexico drew down its line of credit in September 1998
(to considerable acrimony from bank creditors, who felt that by then the
terms were too generous; for a discussion see IIF 1999c, 35–36) and has not
replaced it.
The underlying calculus of contingency ﬁnancing would seem com-
pellingly advantageous for a country that could thereby reduce the proba-
bility of a ﬁnancial crisis, simply because small changes in that probability
would be operating on a large economic base (GDP). It may nonetheless be
diﬃcult politically to enter into contingency ﬁnancing arrangements in
which creditors insist on particularly high spreads if the line is drawn upon.
Perhaps a more fundamental reason why contingent credit lines have not
thrived is that many countries have shifted from ﬁxed to ﬂoating exchange
rates and have run oﬀ the high short-term debt that was more typical prior
to the crises of the late 1990s. An economy with a ﬂoating exchange rate and
low short-term debt is less likely to need, or beneﬁt from, additional liquid-
ity from contingent credit lines. Correspondingly, it may be no accident that
the principal such arrangement currently remains that of Argentina, which
not only has a contingent line of about $7 billion with about a dozen banks,
but also has a rigidly ﬁxed exchange rate under its currency board.23
6.1.8 Conclusion
It has been said that farmers should know the diﬀerence between shear-
ing their sheep and slaughtering them. Involving the private sector in crisis
resolution is the art of knowing this type of diﬀerence. Too heavy a hand by
the oﬃcial sector to force private-sector involvement can transit quickly
into a once-for-all zero sum transfer from the creditor to the debtor fol-
lowed by a persistent cutoﬀ in future credit. The opposite extreme of com-
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23. For its part, the oﬃcial-sector Contingent Credit Lines facility created in 1999 for pre-
qualifying countries with strong policies has remained dormant. The central problem seems to
be that even after qualifying and signing up for the facility, a country might subsequently not
be able to receive funds from it because at the time of request its policies would be judged to
have deteriorated; or, worse, the country might be disqualiﬁed from the facility, prompting
heightened market concerns upon notice of the disqualiﬁcation. It is unclear that changes
adopted in the facility in September 2000 (making the degree of monitoring less intensive than
under other IMF facilities and providing more automatic access in the event of a crisis) will
suﬃce to attract entrants, because the risk of disqualiﬁcation remains.plete laissez-faire toward private creditors coupled with major oﬃcial sup-
port invites public criticism that the oﬃcial sector is bailing out private
creditors.
Given the salient role of mobile capital in modern capital markets, it is
crucial for authorities to distinguish between cases of transitory illiquidity
and those of more protracted insolvency. In the former, the Bagehot prin-
ciple of lending in large volume if necessary to stem a panic should be ap-
plied. It is encouraging that the IMF now has the SRF, which is designed to
do just this. In such cases of illiquidity, it may be necessary to enlist private-
creditor participation through such mechanisms as the arrangement of the
international banks to maintain short-term credit lines in the second quar-
ter of 1999 during Brazil’s crisis. In general, the more voluntary and mar-
ket-oriented this or other participation of private creditors, the better the
chances for prompt reentry of the country into international capital mar-
kets. Where more severe debt problems make rescheduling or restructuring
inescapable, more ﬂexible arrangements such as exchange oﬀers are likely
to be preferable to mandatory reschedulings.
The cases of Mexico, Korea, Brazil, and to a lesser extent Thailand show
that decisive international oﬃcial support combined with adjustment of
macroeconomic and structural policies and relatively voluntary mecha-
nisms for private-sector involvement can restore conﬁdence and market ac-
cess. In a series of smaller-country defaults in 1999, however, the public sec-
tor seemed to be veering more toward mandatory approaches that could
increasingly impose perceived “international ﬁnancial institution risk” in
these markets. Similarly, increasing calls for clear rules of action run the risk
of a failure to recognize the inherent need for creative ambiguity in oﬃcial
intervention, a lesson well known under central banking principles.
Although the emerging capital markets have managed to begin a recov-
ery from the sharp retrenchment of 1998–99, it will be essential that public
policy move in a sophisticated manner on the issue of private-sector in-
volvement in crisis resolution if these markets are to strengthen and provide
the capital so crucial to global economic growth in the future.
References
Bagehot, Walter. [1873] 1917. Lombard Street. 14th ed. London: Kegan, Paul & Co.
Cline, William R. 1995. International debt reexamined. Washington, D.C.: Institute
for International Economics.
———. 1998. IMF-supported adjustment programs in the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
IIF Research Papers series, no. 98-1. Washington, D.C.: Institute of International
Finance, May.
———. 2000a. Ex-im, exports, and private capital: Will ﬁnancial markets squeeze
the ex-im bank? Paper presented at the Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century: A New
494 William R. ClineApproach conference sponsored by the Institute for International Economics.
15–16 May, Washington, D.C.
———. 2000b. The management of ﬁnancial crises. Paper presented at the Kiel
Week Conference 2000 on The World’s New Financial Landscape: Challenges for
Economic Policy. 19–20 June, Kiel, Germany, Institute of World Economics.
Cline, William R., and Kevin J. S. Barnes. 1997. Spreads and risk in emerging mar-
kets lending. IIF Research Paper series, no. 97-1. Washington, D.C.: Institute of
International Finance, December.
Council on Foreign Relations. 1999. Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial
System: the Future International Financial Architecture, Report of an Indepen-
dent Task Force: Carla A. Hills and Peter G. Peterson, co-chairs; Morris Gold-
stein, project director. (Washington: Institute for International Economics, for
Council on Foreign Relations).
Dallara, Charles. 2000. Letter to the chairman of the International Monetary and
Financial Committee, International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C.: Insti-
tute of International Finance. 14 September.
Eaton, Jonathan, and Mark Gersovitz. 1981. Debt with potential repudiation: The-
oretical and empirical analysis. Review of Economic Studies 48 (April): 284–309.
Ecuador. 2000. Republic of Ecuador, “Oﬀer to Exchange.” (Prospectus: Salomon
Smith Barney, 27 July.)
Eichengreen, Barry. 1999. Toward a new international ﬁnancial architecture: A prac-
tical post-Asia agenda. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Ashoka Mody. 2000. Would collective action clauses raise
borrowing costs? NBER Working Paper no. 7458. Cambridge, Mass.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, January.
Group of Seven (G7). 1999. Report of the G7 Finance Ministers to the Köln Eco-
nomic Summit. 18–20 June, Cologne, Germany.
Group of Ten (G10). 1996. The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: A Report to
the ministers and governors prepared under the auspices of the deputies. Washing-
ton, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, May.
Group of Twenty-two (G22). 1998. Report of the working group on international ﬁ-
nancial crises. Washington, D.C.: G22. October.
Institute of International Finance (IIF). 1994. Comparative country statistics. Wash-
ington, D.C.: IIF.
———. 1996. Resolving sovereign ﬁnancial crises.Washington, D.C.: Institute of In-
ternational Finance.
———. 1999a. Capital ﬂows to emerging market economies. Washington, D.C.: In-
stitute of International Finance.
———. Steering Committee on Emerging Markets Finance. 1999b. Involving the
private sector in the resolution of ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets.Washington,
D.C.: Institute of International Finance, April.
———. 1999c. Report of the working group on ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets.
Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Finance.
———. 2000a. Capital ﬂows to emerging market economies. Washington, D.C.: In-
stitute of International Finance.
———. 2000b. Comparative statistics for emerging market economies. Washington,
D.C.: Institute of International Finance.
———. 2001. Principles for private sector involvement in crisis prevention and resolu-
tion. Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Finance.
International Monetary Fund. (IMF). 1999a. International ﬁnancial statistics year-
book. Washington, D.C.: IMF.
———. 1999b. Involving the private sector in forestalling and resolving ﬁnancial
crises. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Creditor Relations 495Meltzer Commission. 2000. Report of the International Financial Institution Advi-
sory Commission (“Meltzer Commission”). Washington, D.C.: International Fi-
nancial Institution Advisory Commission. March.
Portes, Richard. 2000. Sovereign debt restructuring: The role of institutions for col-
lective action. Paper presented at World Bank-IMF-Brookings Institution con-
ference on Emerging Markets in the New Financial System: Managing Financial
and Corporate Distress. 30 March–1 April, Florham Park, New Jersey.
Rieﬀel, Alexis. 1985. The role of the Paris Club in managing debt problems. Essays In
International Finance, no. 161. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University. December.
Zhang, Xiaoming Alan. 1999. Testing for “moral hazard” in emerging markets lend-
ing. IIF Research Papers series, no. 98-1. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Interna-
tional Finance, August.
2. Guillermo Ortiz
Well, knowing that by this time pretty much everything that had to be said
about ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets has been said and repeated, Mar-
tin Feldstein asked me to say a few words about the experience of Mexico
regarding the restoration of creditor relations. I would like to frame this in
a more general discussion of restoring credibility after the crisis. As you
may recall, Mexico maintained a very close relation with the investment
community throughout the 1990s. In fact, it was the Mexican Brady Ex-
change of 1989 that really started a whole asset class of investment in emerg-
ing markets. A few years later, the privatization of Telmex around 1990–91
was a benchmark in developing interest among investors who were not pre-
viously engaged in lending to emerging markets. In fact, during the years
1990–94, between one-half and two-thirds of all portfolio ﬂows to emerging
markets went to Mexico.
As you may remember, the Mexican crisis of 1994–95 caught the finan-
cial community by surprise. Although there were certainly some ominous
signs—all the events of 1994, the political assassination of Colosio, and
so on—it was a real surprise. The timing was really bad: it was right be-
fore Christmas, so investors felt badly deceived by the authorities’ de-
cisions, first to raise the band, and then to float the currency. Thus, the
immediate reaction of course was a complete loss of confidence in the
authorities, and it soon became apparent that the situation that we were
facing was very diﬀerent from previous episodes of balance-of-payments
problems.
It was the first of a new generation of crises that would reappear with
av e ngeance years later in Asia, Russia, Brazil, and other countries. In all
these cases, as we discussed yesterday, there are common features, like the
buildup of short-term obligations by the public sector and by the banking
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in balance sheets; and, in general, a weakened situation of the banking
system’s regulation and supervision. In all these cases, as was amply dis-
cussed yesterday, fixed exchange rate regimes were subject to speculative
attacks.
Another common feature of these cases, as I mentioned, was a loss of
conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial authorities. In the case of Mexico, despite the
fact that economic fundamentals were reasonably good, except perhaps for
a large current account deﬁcit, the magnitude of amortizations that we were
facing in 1995 prompted what became eventually the worst crisis in the
country’s history.
It didn’t take us very long to realize what was going on. In the ﬁrst days
of January, as I recall, we had a meeting—a huge meeting—in New York,
at the Pierre hotel, to be precise. There was massive attendance, and I can
tell you that people were extremely upset. We came out with a program that
had been negotiated with the main sectors of the Mexican economy in the
“pacto” system with the workers, entrepreneurs, and so on. The ﬁrst reac-
tion to the presentation of this program in 1995, surprisingly, was not very
bad. In fact, following the presentation, we had a positive initial response
from the markets; the exchange rate went up, and the stock market also re-
sponded favorably. I remember calling Larry Summers that night and
thinking—this was 5 or 6 January—1995—that we had gone over the
bridge, that we had had a very good start in the process of conﬁdence
restoration. Next morning, as I was leaving for Mexico City, I got a call on
the phone and they told me the markets were in havoc again. Apparently,
the interbank credit lines of some Mexican banks had been discontinued,
the banks were buying in the foreign exchange markets, and the whole pic-
ture changed right away. So, instead of ﬂying to Mexico, I ﬂew to Washing-
ton. That afternoon, there was a meeting with the managing director of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF); then there was a meeting at the U.S.
Treasury. I don’t know, David, if you remember those hours in which the
Federal Reserve took stock with the treasury and ourselves. We started do-
ing some rough back-of-the-envelope calculations of what was the amount
of amortization due in 1995, and it came out to pretty staggering amounts.
We were running a current account deﬁcit of about 7 percent of gross do-
mestic product (GDP)—that was about $40 billion. Plus we had another
$35 billion worth of tesobonosand about $7–8 billion of sovereign debt due,
and amortizations of private debt for another $40–45 billion. So the num-
ber was pretty big, as we sat there.
Anyway, I will not tell you the details of the meeting, but we realized that
the strategy had to have two main elements. One was to put in place an ad-
justment program that would reduce the ﬁnancing needs of Mexico in 1995
and cut the current account deﬁcit. The other was to put suﬃcient money
up front to reassure markets that Mexico would be liquid and would meet
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program with the IMF, although at ﬁrst there had been an initiative on the
part of the United States to guarantee Mexican sovereign debt for $40 bil-
lion, which was shut down in the next few weeks in Congress when it came
to committees. By the end of January, the whole package was pretty much
ﬁnished, and in February we signed it with the treasury, the fund, every-
body. We got commitments for about $50 billion at the time. Thus, the key,
of course, was to restore conﬁdence as soon as possible because, given the
numbers I just mentioned to you, the $40 or 50 billion was insuﬃcient to
cover all the amortizations if we did not regain access to capital markets.
The key was—the betwas—that strengthened economic fundamentals and
suﬃcient money up front would do the trick. This is exactly what happened.
We were able to re-access capital markets six months later, we repaid the
U.S. Treasury fully in 1996–97 (several years ahead of schedule), and re-
cently we ﬁnished paying the IMF.
However, there was a third element that was important in this whole
story, and this element was that it took a lot of conﬁdence of the markets in
the authority. As I mentioned, investors felt betrayed because they felt that
they had been assured by authorities in those early days that there would be
no movement of the exchange rate. Thus, we had to put up a strategy, apart
from the ﬁnancial adjustment package, to try to regain market conﬁdence.
We hired an investment ﬁrm in those days and got advice from some friends,
some of whom are sitting at this table, and we set up what was called an in-
vestor relations oﬃce at the Ministry of Finance. This investor relations
oﬃce had as its main function to be a vehicle of communication with mar-
ket participants, investors, analysts, and rating agencies. We started doing
quarterly conferences, televised or telephone conferences, with the investor
community. We designed a web page around mid-1995 and also organized
several visits to be close to the investment community. This was essentially
the eﬀort that was undertaken by the Finance Ministry and that has been
kept up. Every quarter, the minister of ﬁnance has to present a report to
Congress on the state of public ﬁnances and the state of the economy. Also,
a teleconference with investors around the world is held, and fact statistics
are sent out. The funds and investors that have been active in Mexico get
regular information and can access what they need through the Web. I think
this is, in a nutshell, what was done after 1995.
Let me now make a few comments about what happened at the Bank of
Mexico, because the Bank of Mexico also suﬀered a massive loss of conﬁ-
dence after the devaluation. The ﬁrst task was to provide suﬃcient infor-
mation to the markets. Mexico was accused after the devaluation of 1995 of
hiding information and of not being suﬃciently transparent. The Bank of
Mexico was accused of publishing reserves information only three times a
year. That was true, but the Bank of Mexico had been doing that for forty
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ing information on the tesobono. However, the tesobono holdings data were
published every week, but nobody seemed to look at it except after the crash
in December. Nonetheless, the Bank of Mexico engaged immediately in a
policy of transparency and started publishing on a weekly basis the main
items of its balance sheet, the monetary base, the position of commercial
banks at the central bank, and the open market operations intended for
each day. That became another leg of the transparency eﬀort on the part of
the central bank.
The second important task was designing a monetary policy that would
substitute for the loss of the exchange rate as an anchor when we started
ﬂoating. In the ﬁrst stage, what the Bank of Mexico did was to follow mon-
etary aggregates and target the monetary base, which was the initial anchor
chosen by the Bank of Mexico. However, as inﬂation started coming down,
the relation between the narrow monetary aggregate, or even broader mon-
etary aggregates, and inﬂation was pretty much lost, so in 1998 we started
switching to inﬂation targeting. As Arminio Fraga said yesterday, inﬂation
targeting is one of the only two games in town. In my view, when you are
trying to substitute for a nominal anchor that used to be the exchange rate,
inﬂation targeting is a very good marketing device that allows the central
bank to communicate and, one hopes, to regain more credibility. The main
elements of this inﬂation-targeting regime are, ﬁrst, the annual objectives
we have. We have been targeting an inﬂation of 3 percent for 2003, and last
week we published intermediate targets for 2001 and 2002: 6.5 percent and
4.5 percent, respectively. It helps that, for two years running, we have been
complying with our own targets. For example, this year the target was 10
percent, and we’ll be hitting something like 8.8 or 8.7 percent.
There are other operational details of inﬂation targeting that I will not go
over because I have only a few minutes left. Let me turn now to talk a little
bit about the second part of the subject, which is the participation of the
private sector, and I will be very, very brief and perhaps not very thorough
in what I’m trying to say. I think that the way Mervyn King put it yesterday
in terms of having two choices, either lender of last resort or some sort of
workouts in the context of the discussions that we have been holding, is
pretty much the right approach. In the cases of Mexico and other countries
where we clearly had a run in the initial stages of the crisis, the crisis was
provoked by the capital account, by the ﬁnancial sector, and the like, all the
elements that we can put together. The establishment of an up-front, very
substantial package by the international community, especially including
the United States, was fundamental to restoring conﬁdence. This is true
also of the situations in Brazil, Korea, and Thailand. The argument against
this type of approach, of course, is the question of moral hazard. There is a
common thread of thinking that says, for example, that the Asian crisis was
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four years earlier. However, there’s absolutely no empirical evidence of this,
and I don’t think that this has been the case. For example, after the Mexi-
can crisis, spreads for the Asian debt did not fall. I mean, this is something
that we have been hearing all over, but I fail to see any hard evidence for this
case. I think the Russian situation is totally diﬀerent, and there we have po-
litical elements and so on that I don’t want to discuss at length, but in my
view this whole issue of moral hazard has been greatly exaggerated and has
colored a lot the discussion of private-sector participation. I think George
Soros was right in saying yesterday that the problem going forward is not
excessive lending but too little lending, and I think there’s a lot of evidence
that investors are pulling out of emerging markets. The importance of ded-
icated funds and crossover investors has greatly diminished, in part due to
this whole discussion of ways to try to bring in the private sector in some au-
tomatic way.
Let me conclude by saying that, notwithstanding the legitimate criticism
of some aspects of IMF programs that were touched on yesterday by Jeﬀrey
Sachs and others regarding speciﬁc actions in Indonesia and so on, the
case-by-case approach that has been taken by the fund in the resolution of
ﬁnancial crises is probably right, and after two and a half years of discussing
these issues—after two and a half years of discussing things like changes in
ﬁnancial architecture, international ﬁnancial systems and so on—we have
come up so far with two complete items. One is the Contingent Credit Line
(CCL), and it has not even started: it’s not operational yet. There has been
a discussion for a year and a half. This was an American initiative that was
shut down by the Europeans. Clearly: they put forth all the conditions so
that it would not be utilized. The other item is the sixty-four codes that were
mentioned yesterday. These are the only two complete things that we have
today, so my conclusion is that the lessons that we have learned should serve
to strengthen the internal workings of emerging markets. I think we have all
been learning the lessons of working hard on ﬁxing balance sheets, on mak-
ing the economies more resilient, and all the things we’ve talked about, like
moving to ﬂoat the exchange rate and strengthening the ﬁnancial sector be-
cause, frankly, I don’t have much hope that anything will come out in terms
of reforms in the international ﬁnancial system that will be very helpful.
Now, in the case of Mexico, and to conclude, is all well that ends well? Not
exactly. Although Mexico has been growing by 5.5 percent over the last ﬁve
years, real wages are 80 percent or 85 percent of what they were before the
crisis. Income distribution has worsened substantially after the crisis, and,
let me tell you, there’s absolutely no enthusiasm on the part of the Mexican
population for globalization and for the reforms needed to push forward
this eﬀort, which we all, in this day, think is worthwhile. So we have to re-
ﬂect also on this last item: on the type of political support that is needed in
our countries to continue the globalization process.
500 Guillermo Ortiz3. Roberto G. Mendoza
I would like to thank Martin Feldstein for giving me the opportunity to ex-
press a private-sector viewpoint on the papers that have been presented
here, and in particular I’d like to congratulate William R. Cline on a cogent
and compelling analysis.
The Cline paper largely addresses two issues: ﬁrst, whether “big pro-
grams” are generally beneﬁcial; and second, the relative merits of coercive
rules-based systems and—at the other end of the spectrum—voluntary,
market-based responses to crises. Cline analyzes clearly the theoretical jus-
tiﬁcation for various forms of intervention. He concludes convincingly that
a case-by-case, ﬂexible, noncoercive approach, which explicitly recognizes
the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency and can deal eﬀectively
with the messy, confusing situations that occur every time a crisis erupts.
Cline lists seven principles that should govern crisis management; from a
market participant’s viewpoint, they appear very sound.
In my few minutes I will try to explain why I think that the natural ten-
dencies of markets and the self-interest of market participants will serve to
reinforce the conclusion that the Cline paper draws about the way to pre-
vent, or at least diminish, the risk of emerging market crises and to reduce
their cost when they do occur.
Three main points support this argument. First (and here I completely
agree with Guillermo Ortiz’s thesis), I think that the issue of moral hazard
is of great theoretical interest and little practical import. Cline’s paper ar-
gues that moral hazard represents a general, but frequently trivial, proposi-
tion. That seems about right to me. I don’t believe that any serious creditor
makes an investment decision on the basis that (a) it might go wrong and
(b) if it goes wrong there will be some kind of oﬃcial bailout that will pro-
tect him. In most so-called bailouts, creditors suﬀer large, explicit losses or
implicit reputational losses. A price is paid.
I ﬁnd the idea of debtor moral hazard even more diﬃcult to understand.
Default exacts a huge price on a country’s government, its people, and its
institutions. Avoidance of default through a bailout has lesser but nonethe-
less signiﬁcant adverse consequences. The moral hazard issue requires con-
sideration more (although not exclusively) as a theoretical rather than a
practical matter; I do not believe that it inﬂuences behavior to the extent
that the more extreme opponents of oﬃcial support packages would argue.
Secondly, exchange oﬀers do work. The strongest argument against ex-
change oﬀers, as I understand it, is that in the absence of some type of
legally enforceable cramdown mechanism that ensures completion, the bor-
rower will be sued. However the suits are unlikely to derail the process.
Analogously, many contested merger and acquisitions transactions that in-
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casionally create friction costs. However, they do not often aﬀect the out-
come or materially inﬂuence the underlying economics of a transaction. In
many tender oﬀers, lawsuits are simply a fact of life.
Third, market participants, including oﬃcial institutions, have a ﬂexible
toolkit of standstills, collective action clauses, litigation stays, and other
mechanisms that can prove eﬀective if voluntarily negotiated. The funda-
mental issue is whether it makes sense to impose mechanisms that interfere
with, as opposed to reinforce, the workings of the market. In my opinion,
the former would prove very damaging. Again, I would absolutely agree
with Ortiz’s point that the fear of market-distorting intervention by the oﬃ-
cial sector has contributed importantly to the reduction in size of the emerg-
ing markets asset class.
Three recommendations: ﬁrst, policymakers and regulators should en-
courage—and eventually require—the adoption of fair market value ac-
counting by banks. Arguably, one of the main causes of the crises of the
1990s was that certain market participants (and particularly insured depos-
itories in the case of the Southeast Asian countries) lent money on terms
and conditions that simply misjudged the risk-reward ratio involved. Banks
would extend short-term, ﬂoating-rate, foreign currency ﬁnancing (implic-
itly or explicitly government guaranteed) to borrowers who invested in illiq-
uid projects that generated local currency cash ﬂows. Leaving aside the is-
sue of whether the underlying projects in and of themselves made any sense,
the combination of all the classic mismatches led to the predictable result.
Why did the borrowers make those investments? Primarily because their
riskiness was not reﬂected in the cost of the funding—a situation that can
only end in tears. Commercial banks were prepared to make those loans in
part because they could book assets at cost even though the assets were
worth substantially less than cost on an economic basis. Moreover, there
was a market, the derivatives market, that could have priced that risk rea-
sonably accurately. Fair market value accounting would have forced the
recognition of an immediate loss and therefore sharply inhibited the grant-
ing of such loans.
The systemic problem is even more serious than implied by this simple ex-
ample because derivatives contracts are also booked eﬀectively at cost
rather than at fair market value. The historical cost accounting model per-
mits banks to extend credit at below market rates without recognizing a loss
and to sustain for some time equity price valuations that do not reﬂect their
underlying cash ﬂow–generating capabilities. This encourages ineﬃcient
capital allocation.
The widespread use of fair market value accounting would greatly reduce
both the risk of crises and the cost of resolving them when they occur. How-
ever, there are two kinds of objections to this type of reform, the ﬁrst being
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this point is debatable, greater transparency in ﬁnancial reporting, in my
opinion, would decrease volatility over time. Market volatility is a reality. It
is diﬃcult—some might say impossible—to argue that a failure to recog-
nize this reality in the ﬁnancial statements of banks will decrease the risk in-
herent in the system.
Perhaps the more serious objection is that fair market value accounting
would not in fact impose transparency, owing to the inability to price loans
on a mark-to-market basis. Although this may have been true in the past,
today’s derivatives market for credit risk is broad and deep enough to price
almost any item on or oﬀ a bank’s balance sheet individually and in aggre-
gate with a reasonable degree of accuracy—and certainly more usefully
than historical cost.
My second recommendation is simply that policymakers should not ﬁght
the market view that, for most countries, the appropriate exchange rate pol-
icy is a responsible free ﬂoat, that is, one that permits occasional “leaning
against the wind” but does not attempt to maintain a band.
The third point relates to risk management procedures. The discussion
last night highlighted the self-reinforcing characteristic of risk management
methodologies. Market participants tend to use broadly similar models;
when volatility increases, there is generalized pressure either to commit
more capital or to reduce risk exposures. The latter approach represents the
more natural tendency for publicly held ﬁrms (as opposed to hedge funds),
with the result that volatility levels often increase further.
This view is largely accurate but is not an argument for downplaying the
validity of the models. Rather, it simply suggests that the senior manage-
ments of ﬁnancial ﬁrms must be quantitatively sophisticated enough to un-
derstand the subtleties of model outputs in order to have the conﬁdence to
override them when appropriate. This is a more complex responsibility than
the traditional supervision of risk takers and places an added burden on the
regulators to satisfy themselves that senior managements and boards are in
a position to assume it.
The above three points suggest that, wherever possible, the regulators
should seek to allow market discipline rather than oﬃcial intervention to
regulate the ﬁnancial system. This would support the notion that govern-
ments should seek to reduce the distortions created by deposit insurance,
possibly through the adoption of narrow banking models, although other,
less radical market-oriented initiatives (such as mandatory subordinated
debt issuance) may prove more realistic in the near term.
The debate in this conference has focused on the source of discipline to
reduce the probability of crises and mitigate their impact when they do oc-
cur. The Cline paper argues persuasively that the market itself is the best
source of that discipline. The removal of distortions such as coercive oﬃcial
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over time, increase the eﬀectiveness of market discipline and therefore re-
duce systemic risk. Advances in technology have made this possible for two
fundamental reasons: (a) they have facilitated the development of the de-
rivatives markets, which encourage a more eﬃcient pricing, segmentation,
and distribution of all types of risk; and (b) information has become a free
good, seamlessly accessible by all market participants. Transparency of and
access to information permit the market to act as an enlightened policy-
maker. We heard last night that market participants should anticipate a reg-
ulatory and policy framework that combines “constructive ambiguity . . .
with constrained discretion.” This sounds like an intelligent complement to
market discipline.
4. Ammar Siamwalla
It is amazing how much a change in perspective can aﬀect the way one an-
alyzes a given problem. Cline’s paper starts from the private-sector lenders’
perspective, and when there is a ﬁnancial crisis, then the matter becomes a
matter of “public-sector” concern, meaning by this, ﬁrst, the borrowers’
governments. Usually, it is the insuﬃciency of foreign exchange reserves to
cope with a sudden exodus of the private creditors that ignites a ﬁnancial
crisis and the consequent arrival of the International Monetary Fund. The
question that arises is how the private (lending) banks can be drawn in to
minimize the attendant damage to the country and, perhaps, to the banks
themselves.
For those of us living in the trenches, to ask how the private sector (both
domestic and foreign) can be asked to bail the public sector out would ap-
pear quite odd (not wrong, but odd). The problem that Thailand and, I
daresay, most other countries in Asia have been facing since 1997 is how to
minimize the damage to our public ﬁnances from bailing out both our own
private sector (banks and, in some cases, corporations as well) and the for-
eign banks. That the Thai crisis took place was due mostly to the heavy re-
liance on bank lending, notwithstanding the global shift in international in-
vestment toward equity and away from debt reported in Cline’s paper. Most
Thai borrowers depended heavily on borrowing from domestic banks (and
their Bangkok International Banking Facility window), which in turn bor-
rowed abroad for their dollar-denominated loans.
At the end of 1996, Thailand’s total private external debt was $92 billion
(its gross domestic product [GDP] at the then exchange rate was $180 bil-
lion); of this amount, the corporate sector (including the ﬁnance compa-
nies) owed directly to foreign lenders approximately $45 billion, the rest be-
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rate sector in dollars. The rush to exit after the ﬂoating of the baht1 by the
foreign lenders led to the rapid depreciation of the currency, which in eﬀect
led a large proportion of the Thai private sector to become insolvent. In or-
der to prevent the run on the domestic ﬁnancial institutions by both depos-
itors and foreign lenders, the government had to give a blanket guarantee
for both depositors and lenders for all ﬁnancial institutions, except the six-
teen that closed before the issuance of the guarantee. This guarantee is turn-
ing out to be very costly for the taxpayers, with recent cost estimates for ﬁ-
nancial system restructuring running as high as 40 percent of GDP. Let it
be noted that the cost of this bailout, including the cost to the foreign banks,
is being borne almost entirely by the Thai taxpayers.
What could have been done to minimize the damage? One suggestion by
Cline would have lessened it somewhat: to promote a private-sector collec-
tive action. At the very least, the sharp currency depreciation in the last
quarter of 1997 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 that follows from the exodus of
the foreign banks would be limited. The open question in such a situation is
the role of the government to nudge the various parties toward an agree-
ment. In this respect, one thing the Thai government should have done was
to make its guarantee of loans to ﬁnancial institutions conditional upon an
extension of the term of the loans.
In the event, the only thing that the Thai government did was to request
the various banks to limit their withdrawals voluntarily. Only the Japanese
banks appeared to have done so, but then Japanese banks were lending
mostly to subsidiaries of Japanese multinationals.
By the middle of 1998, the rush to the exit door and the sharp currency
depreciation came to an end. From that point on, the Thai government’s
central task has been to see to the restructuring the ﬁnancial sector, which
had been laid low by the fact that most of their loans have gone sour. Most
of the smaller banks and many ﬁnance companies were taken over by the
government, and the hole in their capital was or will be ﬁlled by the gov-
ernment. The larger banks were given time (approximately two and one-
half years) to recapitalize themselves, with the government oﬀering to pro-
vide part of the money. While this recapitalization process is going on,
banks had to work out their problem loans with their debtors. With both
lenders and borrowers starved of equity, it is unsurprising that there was a
sharp fall of investment, and thence of output, which further accentuated
the problem of nonperforming loans.
What the Thai government did not do at the time was to buy out the prob-
lem loans from the banks and park it somewhere, so as to let the banks re-
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1. The attack on the baht in the last quarter of 1996 and the ﬁrst half of 1997 was launched
mostly by the speculators. This led to the depletion of the reserves and the ﬂoating of the cur-
rency. Relatively little outﬂow of bank money took place before the devaluation. The bulk of
that outﬂow took place in the second half of 1997 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1998.sume lending. The main fear was that these problem loans, once parked,
particularly in a government-owned parking lot, would sharply deteriorate.
Indeed, the performance of the state banks since 1997 indicates very clearly
that this route would have been unwise.
Discussion Summary
Anne O. Kruegersuggested that we need a better theory of crisis. In addition
to addressing the causes of crisis, the theory should help us understand
when there are opportunities for reform. One issue here is how much you
take advantage of short-term problems to address long-term problems such
as chronic ﬁscal deﬁcits or weak banking systems. Another issue is how far-
reaching the reforms should be. Krueger said that this depends in part on
whether you are trying to avoid crises in the short to medium term or trying
to change the structure of the economy so that a crisis never happens again.
The answer depends in part how often the country needed help in the past.
Turkey, which has suﬀered repeated crises, might be treated diﬀerently from
Korea, which has been relatively crisis-free. On the other hand, Krueger
pointed out that Korea continues to have serious problems with nonper-
forming loans in its banking system and so remains vulnerable to a future
crisis.
Krueger said that her implicit theory is that crises come along because
governments did not pursue the necessary structural reforms, and they will
continue to put them oﬀ until forced to do so. This leads her to believe that
structural reforms such as banking reform and trade liberalization should
be part of the crisis response. If, instead, you hold the view that govern-
ments will reform in good time, then it is sensible to concentrate on the im-
mediate things necessary to overcome the crisis.
Martin Wolf agreed that crises lead countries to reform. Even so, this
does not mean that crises are a good time to try to push through reforms.
He thinks that having someone come in from outside de-legitimizes reform
over the longer run. Turning to Cline’s paper, he said he did not agree with
the most important point—which he summed up as “give lots of money.”
He pointed out that the crises have imposed massive social costs both in
terms of recessions and ﬁscal costs to taxpayers. The participants in the ﬁ-
nancial transactions did not internalize these costs. He concludes that the
optimal ﬂow of short-term capital to Asia may be zero and that it is wrong
to insure investors fully against the risks.
Andrew Crockett agreed with Roberto Mendoza about the desirability of
“fair value” or mark-to-market accounting in the ﬁnancial sector. However,
the case was not an open-and-shut one. There are both practical and con-
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loans. Moreover, other interested parties, such as securities supervisors and
the tax authorities, have reservations about allowing provisions before a
probability of loss has been established. Still others are concerned about the
volatility that mark-to-market accounting would introduce into ﬁnancial
institutions’ income streams. Nevertheless, despite all the obstacles, he felt
that this approach was the best way of disciplining risk taking.
On the subject of risk management practices, Crockett argued that ﬁ-
nancial institutions were reasonably good at valuing what he called “rela-
tive risks,” (i.e., the riskiness of diﬀerent claims at a point in time) but less
good at measuring absolute undiversiﬁable risks associated with the eco-
nomic cycle. He said, “we all know the worst loans are made at the best
times.” The challenge in designing supervisory arrangements and risk man-
agement practices is to develop models that are better attuned to the move-
ment of risk over the cycle.
Peter Garber pointed out that ﬁnancial institutions use stress testing and
event risk scenarios to go beyond value-at-risk modeling. These can be used
to put quantitative limits on positions beyond what the value-at-risk mod-
els would dictate. Moreover, these methods are much more cyclically ori-
ented, he said. Regarding the ease of marking to market, he agreed that
credit derivatives could be very useful but said there is a lot of “magic” in-
volved in their pricing as well, and he stressed the diﬃculties of pricing very
long-term loans and illiquid credits. He agreed that asset-backed securities
could be used to value packages of loans, but he again noted that it is not as
easy as one might think to come up with accurate values.
Jacob Frenkel returned to the issue of reform “ownership.” He remem-
bered that it used to be the case that the IMF was comfortable with being
“bashed” for the reforms they demanded. Governments often found it use-
ful to be seen as coerced by the IMF in pushing through politically diﬃcult
reforms. However, this turned out to be an untenable situation, he said. The
program does not have to be designed in the capital of the country. It can be
designed by experts anywhere and negotiated. Wherever it is designed, once
a program is agreed upon it must be under the ownership of the government
if it is to have a chance of success.
Montek S. Ahluwaliaraised the issue of what can be expected from the in-
ternational community as lenders of last resort as opposed to reliance on
private-sector involvement. Commenting on the phrase “constructive am-
biguity” from Cline’s paper, he said that constructive ambiguity is better
than destructive ambiguity but added that what developing countries need
is some constructive clarity. Developing countries would be better oﬀknow-
ing the limits to the oﬃcial assistance they can get and, beyond that, what
the rules for involving the private sector would be. Given Robert Rubin’s
prediction that there will be more crises in the future with more countries
engaging with the international capital markets, Ahluwalia reiterated that
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tion exists. At present, the only way that the lender of last resort can do a
credible job is if IMF resources are topped up with substantial bilateral re-
sources, and this (perhaps unavoidably) introduces a great deal of political
uncertainty. Ahluwalia is not sure this is “constructive.”
William R. Cline said he understood the desire for clarity, but he sees a
danger in a “very quick slide from clarity into essentially mandatory reso-
lution.” Cline believes it is much better to get toward what he called the vol-
untary end of private-sector involvement. The clearer you are, the more
likely it is you go to capital controls. Moreover, the easier it is to default, the
more likely it is that you shut down lending. He agreed with Roberto Men-
doza and Guillermo Ortiz that the experiments in “bailing in” the private
sector had contributed to the rising spreads and “sluggishness” that we
have seen in some markets. Finally, he said he disagreed with Mervyn King
that it will be impossible to come up with the large packages we have seen
in the past. He asked: “If Chile goes down tomorrow, for example, is it im-
possible to come up with $7 billion—the same fraction of GNP we came up
with for Brazil?” He understands why King is saying this, given the need to
avoid the moral hazard problem that comes with large packages. He thinks
that because of the good record of Chile or a comparable country, it is very
likely that such a case would successfully be toward the voluntary end of
private-sector involvement. Given this likely involvement, Cline thinks we
need to be very careful in moving in the direction of too much coercion.
E. Gerald Corrigan said that a sizable majority of emerging market coun-
tries were making progress in most areas of crisis prevention—macro pol-
icy, debt management policy, risk management policy, and so on—but
noted that progress has been very slow in banking reform. He expressed sur-
prise that a better job had not been done through prudential supervisory
practices at dealing with the problem of short-term unsecured credit. Given
the progress that has been made, he said that the risk of systemic sovereign
ﬁnancial crisis has come down, but added that it is nowhere near zero. On
the interbank restructuring in Korea in 1997–98, he pointed out that there
had been a lot of comment that it was a bad idea and had been forced upon
Korea by the IMF. He thinks both these claims are wrong and said there
were a number of approaches on the table at that time that would have been
rejected outright by the Korean government.
On the issue of what should be done in the future regarding private-sector
involvement, Corrigan listed four alternatives: outright new money, unilat-
eral suspension of payments, voluntary standstills, and voluntary restruc-
turing. He thinks the ﬁrst of these—new money—will not happen and the
second—stopping payments—is a recipe for further instability. He thinks
the emphasis should be put on the latter two options on the list, although
he agrees with Mendoza that what is “voluntary” is sometimes in the eye of
the beholder.
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tions, recognizing that there is no one thing that is going to solve the prob-
lem at the point of crisis. He added that the Fund’s adjusted Contingent
Credit Facility (CCF) should now be seen as part of the menu, and if it is
made more ﬂexible, it could be the basis for encouraging a greater use of ap-
propriately priced private-sector standby-type facilities. Corrigan ﬁnished
with the controversial opinion that, in “truly exceptional circumstances,”
there could be limited and partial oﬃcial-sector credit enhancements. Al-
though he expected that most people did not want to hear that, he reminded
the audience that this was exactly what was done with Brady bonds. Thus,
in shaping a menu, he said we “should never say never.”
Paul Volcker disagreed that crises occurred primarily because of weak
banking systems. Instead, he sees the problem in the nature of ﬁnancial
markets and their wide swings coming up against small and inherently vul-
nerable ﬁnancial systems. Mexico didn’t have a crisis because of its weak
banking system but because of its rising tesobono debt. He said that ﬁnan-
cial markets ordinarily prosper from volatility, but he asked if industry can
prosper in such an environment. Such volatility, he added, has a limited im-
pact on the United States because it is a large, stable economy. It plays
havoc, however, with smaller economies, in part because they are more vul-
nerable to exchange rate swings.
George Soros complained that there was no discussion of what had hap-
pened in Russia. He said that the G7 did not want to put up their own
money, and the IMF was limited in what it could do since it signed a letter
of intent with a government that could not produce. More generally, he said
it would be useful to have a mechanism whereby a letter would be forth-
coming from the Fund stating the conditions that were necessary for it to
act as a lender of last resort.
On the question of what works and what doesn’t in responding to a crisis,
Jeﬀrey Sachs made two observations. First, he said that the “hemorrhag-
ing” must be stopped. To do this, you need to understand where it is com-
ing from—ﬁscal deﬁcits or the ﬁnancial sector. If the problem is ﬁscal, then
the ﬁscal gap must be closed. If the problem is ﬁnancial, there are three op-
tions: new money, a unilateral standstill, and a voluntary rollover. Sachs
said that it is wrong to rule out any of these, adding that Mexico “worked”
because of the United States, but often new money or a rollover will not be
forthcoming.
Second, Sachs said that running things from Washington is not sustain-
able in today’s world. Part of the problem is that “no money is brought to
the table, only conditions,” said Sachs, pointing to the negative net trans-
fers to Africa. He said that he would not rule out considering issues of
long-term management, but the current mix of conditions without money
is failing. Moreover, he thinks that the current model we are using for de-
velopment is fatally limited. The issues should not be limited to questions
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and clean water.
Frederic Mishkin said that we needed to think of the IMF as ﬁghting a
war. It needs to focus on two things: macro policy and getting the ﬁnancial
sector working again (which requires some structural reform). However, he
said, “this is where it should stop.” Referring to Nicholas Stern’s suggestion
from an earlier session, he said the World Bank should not have two-page
plans for structural reform ready to implement at the time of the crisis but,
rather, should focus on long-term thinking. In Mishkin’s view the IMF has
a high-quality staﬀ, but it is overwhelmed. It is also in a political bind. On
one side the Meltzer commission tells it to narrow its focus. However, the
IMF’s board has not strongly supported this.
Lin See Yan suggested that the Malaysian case is interesting in that it
opted ﬁrst for IMF advice (even though it was not eligible for ﬁnancial as-
sistance because the economy was judged to be “still strong” when entering
the crisis), that is, tighten the ﬁscal budget (despite three previous years of
large surpluses); tighten monetary policy (by raising interest rates to protect
capital outﬂows); and reduce balance-of-payments current deﬁcit (even
though it was not in fundamental disequilibrium). This sent the economy
into a tailspin that threatened political and social stability and led to further
loss of conﬁdence. The IMF’s hungry “big eyes are much too wide for its
narrow stomach,” Lin said. Malaysia needed to change horses in midstream
with worsening expectations regarding exchange rate volatility, portfolio
capital outﬂows and stock market sentiment. The objective of public policy
then turned its focus on the reestablishment of social and business stability
through a number of pragmatic measures: (a) adopting Keynesian expan-
sionary ﬁscal programs directed mainly at social (education and health)
and poverty spending; (b) ﬁxing the exchange rate to the US$ with the 40
percent devaluation (expectations pointing to 60 percent) to inject certainty
in doing business; (c) introducing easy-to-implement selective capital con-
trols directed mainly at temporarily stopping further portfolio outﬂows and
denying speculators ready access to ringgit bank balances and currency;
and (d) setting up the National Economic Action Council to take direct
charge of crisis management, with full powers to implement eﬀectively the
“new” deal, including setting up new institutions to act on banking reform,
bank recapitalization, and debt restructuring and resolution. Ironically,
this option is not really unorthodox—indeed, it is a rather conventional
Keynesian approach to reﬂate and reestablish conﬁdence (after all, the IMF
rules do allow temporary capital controls in a crisis). It introduced a mod-
ernized system of selected capital controls (designed to ﬁt the occasion), a
system that is highly focused, with rules precisely deﬁned for eﬀective im-
plementation; well organized, leaving the banks’ vast network with wide-
ranging authority to approve; clearly decentralized, so that only large trans-
actions need to be referred to the central bank; and subject to constant
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reaucratic ineﬃciencies or black market in the ringgit reﬂects well on the ap-
propriateness of the mechanisms that have been put in place. All in all, the
prompt return of conﬁdence and the early V-shaped economic recovery,
with no adverse political and social fallout, appear to suggest that there
may be something in the Malaysian way of managing its own type of crisis.
Timothy Geithner said that those who have been heavily critical of the
Fund should temper their criticisms with some humility and ask themselves
what they would have done, and how they would have performed, in simi-
lar circumstances with similar information and similar time pressures. Re-
sponding to Mervyn King’s presentation on creditor relations, Geithner
said he was troubled by King’s enthusiasm for the broader use of standstills
or suspensions of payments and in particular by establishing any presump-
tion that a standstill would be invoked as a condition for access to large-
scale ﬁnancial assistance. Responding to Jeﬀrey Sachs, he said that the cru-
cial issue is not necessarily whether net transfers to the poorest countries
are too low, but that if you believe they are and want to see them increased
you have to have a framework in place that will make that possible. The in-
volvement in the IMF is likely to be critical to the willingness of donors to
provide more concessional resources.
Paul Keatingexpressed the view that the world can no longer be run from
the United States. The United States Congress has neither the internation-
alism nor the will to do it. The world’s remaining superpower has become
less generous over time, he said, and has downgraded the importance of In-
dia and China in the world. He said that India has to take nuclear actions
to get noticed. In his view, the structure that followed the allied victory in
1945 is no longer adequate. The key question now is how we empower the
Bretton Woods institutions, which are struggling with a world of integrated
international markets and new communications technologies. He also ques-
tioned how representative the G7 is and blamed the Clinton administration
for failing to create a more inclusive world order. He closed by saying the
middle powers must be recognized and allowed to have a role in decision
making, remarking, “the old political structure has had its day.”
With respect to the issue of private-sector involvement, Edwin Truman
said his sense is that this issue is often oversimpliﬁed as one involving bank
or bond creditors on the one hand and a sovereign borrower on the other,
or perhaps banks with the explicit or implicit guarantee of the sovereign.
However, in the three major Asian cases and Brazil, although not Russia,
this assumption about the dominant involvement of the sovereign did not
hold. In those cases, broad-based private-sector involvement (i.e., a stand-
still) would have had two potentially troublesome consequences: First, it
would have involved the extensive application of exchange and capital con-
trols that, once imposed, are usually very diﬃcult to dismantle and also can
be very disruptive to trade. Second, it would have risked the socialization of
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would have looked to the government to guarantee the repayment of obli-
gations that had been blocked. As we saw in the 1980s, such socialization of
debt is very expensive and undesirable, given that it leads to a bailout of the
private sector.
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